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The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a cap-and-trade program 
regulating the carbon emissions of specific industrial facilities and is the EU’s primary policy 
mechanism for complying with emissions reduction targets found in the Kyoto Protocol. This 
dissertation examines the overall effectiveness of the EU ETS and more specifically what factors 
explain why some member states are more successful at reducing their carbon emissions than 
others. OLS and logistic regression models are constructed as well as qualitative case studies of 
Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and Greece,  to examine observed differences in emissions in all 27 
EU member states from 2005-2010 The models include variables relating to the overall capacity 
of the state to reduce emissions as well as other institutional factors, including measures of 
corruption, public opinion, renewable energy production, domestic oil production, green party 
presence in the national government and European Parliament, cabinet ideology, length of EU 
membership, post-communism and how permits are allocated. The time period examined 
includes the entire trial phase as well as the first three years of the first commitment period of 
Kyoto. The factors that best explain success or failure to effectively reduce emissions in the EU 
may provide insight into how best to achieve future emissions reductions there as well as in other 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
Climate Change as a Global Issue 
Over the last two decades global climate change has become accepted as a serious 
environmental problem by a growing majority in the scientific community. According to the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean 
temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (IPCC 
2007, 30). There are both natural and anthropogenic factors that can contribute to global 
warming processes. However, there is much evidence that it is the exponential increase in human 
production greenhouse gases (GHGs)
1
 starting in the industrial revolution that has most impacted 
the changing climactic system. Indicators that the climate is changing include sea level rise of 
6.7 inches in the last century, increasing global surface temperatures since 1880, increasing 
ocean temperatures, the melting of the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, reduction in Arctic 
sea ice, shrinking glaciers in some parts of the world, increases in extreme events including 
record temperatures and intense rainfall, and ocean acidification.
2
 The concentration of 
atmospheric CO₂ is also at the highest level it has ever been in the last 650,000 years and, given 
that the most current trend of increasing levels of CO₂ began in the industrial revolution, many 
see this as direct evidence that this current period of climate change has been due to 
anthropogenic activities.
3
 As consensus in the scientific community has grown, so have the 
number of policies proposed and enacted by international organizations and individual states.  
                                                          
1
 Greenhouse gasses include water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, ozone, nitrous oxide, and some fluorine gasses.  
Also, see http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html  
2
 See http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ and 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#.T-NGdPWaKSo  
3
  See graph of atmospheric CO₂ over time here  http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/   
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History and Emergence of Climate Science. The greenhouse effect,
4
 or how gases in 
the atmosphere can trap heat from solar energy, was first described in 1824 by a French scientist, 
Jean-Baptiste Fourier. In 1904 Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish scientist, discovered that increases 
in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could lead to warming.
5
 By the 1950s Roger Revelle, a 
geophysicist working as the director of Scripps Institute of Oceanography, demonstrated that 
human use of fossil fuels specifically had contributed to increased levels of CO₂ in the earth’s 
atmosphere
6
. In the 1950s, Charles Keeling, a scientist also working at Scripps, was the first 
person to take direct measurements of atmospheric carbon. He discovered that levels of 
atmospheric CO₂ were increasing.7 
Climate Change as a Growing Global Policy Concern. Climate change first started to 
gain widespread attention as a global issue in 1988 when James Hanson testified in the United 
States Congress that warming due to the greenhouse effect would become an increasing problem, 
and when the IPCC was established. In 1990, the IPCC released its First Assessment Report on 
climate change. The report was intended to be used to “assist policymakers and future 
negotiators in their respective tasks” and it also recommended that the report be given 
consideration by “every government as it cuts across different sectors in all countries.” The 
report also reflected “the technical assessment of experts rather than government positions” 
(IPPC 1990, 51) and declared “We are certain of the following: There is a natural greenhouse 
effect which already keeps the earth warmer than it would otherwise be. Emissions resulting 
from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the 
                                                          
4
 See http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html#greenhouseeffect and http://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ 
for more information about the greenhouse effect.  
5
 See http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Arrhenius/  
6
 See http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Revelle/  
7
 See http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/science/globalwarming/timeline.html for a timeline of climate 
change science and policy 
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greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide. 
These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional 
warming of the Earth’s surface” (IPCC 1990, 52). Thus far, there have been three other 




The Earth Summit was held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and one of the documents produced 
at this United Nations conference was the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 
UNFCCC proved to be inadequate and in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. The Kyoto 
Protocol established binding targets of emissions reductions to be made by those countries that 
signed and ratified the document. All member states of the European Union are parties to Kyoto 
and the European Union Emissions Trading System is the primary mechanism being utilized to 
meet their targets. The United States signed, but never ratified the Protocol.  
Projected Consequences of Climate Change  
Global Impacts. The IPCC reported in its Fourth Assessment Report on climate change 
that if emissions levels of GHGs continue at or above current levels changes in the earth’s 
climate would be larger than the observed changes of the 20
th
 century. The report also projected 
changes including: 
Warming greatest over land and at most high northern latitudes and least over Southern 
Ocean and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean, continuing recent observed trends. 
Contraction of snow cover area, increases in thaw depth over most permafrost regions 
and decrease in sea ice extent; in some projections using SERES scenarios, Arctic late-
summer sea ice disappears almost entirely by the later part of the 21
st
 century. Very likely 
increase in frequency of hot extremes, heat waves and heavy precipitation. Likely 
increase in tropical cyclone intensity; les confidence in global decrease of tropical 
cyclone numbers. Poleward shift of extra-tropical storm tracks with consequent changes 
in wind, precipitation and temperature patterns. Very likely precipitation increases in 
                                                          
8
 See http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#.T-NOm_WaKSp to access 
full versions of each IPCC assessment.  
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Projected Impacts in Europe. According to the European Environment Agency, Europe 
is already starting to experience the effects of anthropogenic climate change and by 2007 the 
average land temperature was 1.2 °C higher than pre-industrial levels. Temperatures are 
predicted to continue to increase in Europe this century between 1-5.5 °C with eastern and 
northern Europe experiencing the most warming in winter and south-western and Mediterranean 
Europe experiencing more pronounced warming in the summer. Future temperature changes in 
Europe based on projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are as 
follows: 
The annual average temperature for Europe is projected to increase by 1.0-5.5 °C 
(comparing 2080-2100 with the 1961-1990 average). This range takes into account the 
uncertainties in the future socio-economic development by including two of the IPCC-
SRES scenarios…The warming is projected to be greatest over eastern Europe, 
Scandinavia and the Arctic in winter (December to February), and over south-western 
and Mediterranean Europe in Summer (June to August). (EEA 2008, 43) 
 
The incidences of heat waves are also expected to increase, and are expected have the largest 
effect on Greece, the Iberian Peninsula, and central Europe. Precipitation patterns have also been 
changing. The EEA reported that between 1961 and 2006 northern Europe received an increase 
of between 10 and 40 percent in annual precipitation while in some parts of southern Europe 
precipitation has decreased up to 20 percent. Projections of future precipitation patterns expect 
this general pattern to continue, with increased annual precipitation in northern Europe, 
particularly in the winter, and a decrease in precipitation in southern Europe especially in the 
summer.  
 
                                                          
9
 See http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms3.html for full report on Projected Climate Change 
and Its Impacts from the Fourth IPCC Assessment. 
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Research Questions  
Given the serious potential impact of climate change globally, and in Europe specifically 
this study examines the effectiveness of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). The EU ETS is the world’s first cap-and-trade program for CO₂ emissions and all member 
states in the European Union are using this policy mechanism as their primary tool to meet their 
Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets. Since this is the first carbon 
emission trading program, and it is on a large, continental scale, the success or failure of the EU 
ETS could have a substantial impact on global climate and provide a model for future policies. 
The primary research question examined in this dissertation is: What factors explain the 
observed differences among different EU member states’ abilities to reduce the amount of CO₂ 
emissions produced at facilities regulated under the EU ETS? The answers to this question may 
provide useful insights into success or failure to reduce emissions that could inform the design of 
other cap-and-trade programs, and insights into what types of states may be able to implement 
this type of system most effectively. In addition, if there are certain factors that seem to interfere 
with a country’s ability to be successful in reducing their emissions using this particular policy 
mechanism, states with those characteristics may want to try to change those conditions or select 
a different policy tool.  
Methods and Design of the Dissertation  
 Both quantitative and qualitative methods are utilized in this analysis. In chapter 4, 
utilizing an original dataset, two OLS regression models and two logit models are constructed to 
evaluate the influence of corruption, public opinion on climate change, renewable energy 
production, oil production, green party presence in government, cabinet ideology, length of EU 
membership, green party representation in the European Parliament, post-communism, per capita 
6 
 
GDP on levels of verified greenhouse gas emission per capita as well as meeting EU ETS 
emissions targets. Chapters 6 through 9 include qualitative case studies using structured focused 
comparison to examine four specific EU member states in greater detail; Sweden, Denmark, 
Portugal, and Greece. Chapter 5 outlines the methods used in the case analyses in greater detail. 
Usefulness of the Comparative Perspective. Comparative environmental politics and 
policy is a relatively new and understudied area of political science and “the research literature is 
limited. Most of what we know about different countries’ environmental policies and outcomes 
is based on single-country descriptive studies” (McBeath and Rosenberg 2006, 14). There is 
much work that needs to be done to add to this young and growing body of literature. “As has 
been pointed out frequently, environmental problems tend to be global and transboundary by 
nature. As such, they challenge the capacity of nation-states to make and implement effective 
policy” (McBeath and Rosenberg 2006, 5). Climate change is clearly a global, transboundary 
issue where the problem, levels of greenhouse gases that are too high and increasing, affects a 
very large common-pool resource, the entire atmosphere. In addition, environmental problems 
faced in one state are likely to be present in others as well, and there is significant potential for 
policy learning and diffusion to intentionally occur if solutions have been proven to work in 
other or multiple contexts.  
There is also a need for more information on how domestic factors may influence 
environmental policy success or failure. “Given the preoccupation of scholars, policy-makers 
and activists with globalization, it is not surprising that the bulk of the political science literature 
on world environmental politics comes from the sub-fields of international relations and 
international political economy. But what becomes clear in perusing this literature is the need for 
a better understanding of the roles of domestic social forces and the political structures of nation-
7 
 
states” (McBeath and Rosenberg 2006, 6). McBeath and Rosenberg further argue that it is 
important to study environmental politics across countries the following way: 
We take the position that nation-states and their governments still matter for three 
reasons. First, they are the locus of decision-making for a wide range of economic, social, 
cultural and resource management policies that affect the global environment, National 
governments, then, are the prime targets of local, national and transnational 
environmental activism. Second, only national governments can decide whether to join or 
not join, cooperate or not cooperate with international environmental agreements, treaties 
and protocols. And finally, many of the differences we find among the environmental 
policies and situations of nation-states depend on domestic political variables, including 
ideology, regime type, political culture, state-society relations, and scientific and 
institutional capacity. (McBeath and Rosenberg 2006, 7) 
Plan of the Dissertation. Chapter Two describes the emergence of the modern 
environmental movement to give perspective on the events that led to the creation of the current 
institutions and policies addressing environmental problems. The emergence of climate change 
as a global issue is also examined. Chapter Three describes the use of emissions trading as a 
policy mechanism to reduce pollutants and gives examples of how it has been used in the past. 
The creation and function of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is also examined in 
detail. Chapter Four looks at influences on climate change policy and emissions reductions both 
at the domestic and EU level and includes a statistical analysis of the influences on emissions 
reductions in EU member states. Chapters Five through Nine constitute the second half of the 
dissertation and provide a qualitative examination of the influences on emissions trends. Using 
four specific member states, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Greece as examples, the case 
studies analyses examine the variables included in the statistical analysis in greater detail and in 
the context of other country specific factors. Finally, chapter Ten summarizes results and lessons 
from the statistical models, the case studies, and provides conclusions based on both the 
8 
 
qualitative and quantitative analyses. Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research 
























Chapter 2: Environmental and Climate Change Policy in Europe 
Emergence of the Modern Environmental Movement  
The origins of the modern environmental movement can be traced to the conservationists 
and preservationists of the 1800s and 1900s. Conservationism focused primarily on resource 
management practices with goals of utilizing and maintaining forests, wildlife, and soil in ways 
that would ensure their continued productiveness for human use. Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the 
Forest Service in the United States from 1898 to 1910, is often associated with early 
conservation ideas and practices. While forestry and forest management had been practiced in 
Europe, it was not until Pinchot helped found the discipline in the United States
10
 that it began to 
merge with the new ideas of conservation. In an anecdote described in a 1937 article appearing 
in Agricultural History, Pinchot described how his thoughts on what would become the paradigm 
of conservation emerged:  
I was riding my old horse Jim in Rock Creek Park one day—I think it was in February  
1907—when suddenly the idea that put stone on the end of the club occurred to me. The 
idea was that all these natural resources which we had been dealing with as though they 
were watertight compartments actually constituted one united problem. That problem was 
the use of the earth for the permanent good of man. We had been dealing with our 
continent piecemeal, and of course we were losing an immense amount of steam and 
effectiveness by acting as single scouts scattering our efforts—like using bird shot instead 
of a single ball to kill a bear—and not attacking the problem in a united battalion. The 
idea was so new that it did not even have a name. Of course it had to have a name. Our 
little inside group discussed it a great deal. Finally Overton Price suggested that we 
should call it ‘conservation’ and the President said ‘O.K.’ So we called it the 
conservation movement. (Pinchot 1937, 262) 
 
Pinchot described what he saw as the three great purposes of conservation as follows: 
 
First: wisely to use, protect, preserve, and renew the natural resources of the earth.  
Second: to control the use of the natural resources and their products in the common 
interest, and to secure their distribution to the people at fair and reasonable charges for 
goods and services. Third: to see to it that the rights of the people to govern themselves 
                                                          
10
 Pinchot studied helped found the Yale School of Forestry, the first school in the US dedicated to the study of 
forestry. See http://environment.yale.edu/about/history/  
10 
 
shall not be controlled by great monopolies through their power over natural resources. 
(Pinchot 1947, 506) 
 
Competing with the anthropocentric resource management-based views of conservation 
was the paradigm of preservation. John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club, is among the most 
well-known preservationists. Preservationists, particularly Muir, argue that the natural world had 
incalculable spiritual and aesthetic values and that some places should be preserved in their 
entirety because they rival churches and temples as places of inspiration and spiritual renewal for 
humanity. This view of nature continues to influence environmental thought most strongly in the 
sub-discipline of deep ecology. Muir “recognized the necessity of the formal preservation of wild 
country if future generations were to have any left” and felt that “wild nature, he believed, 
provided the best ‘conductor of divinity’ because it was least associated with man’s artificial 
constructs” (Nash 1967, 425). In the opening paragraph of Muir’s 1901 book Our National 
Parks, He describes the virtues of preservation and its value to society: 
The tendency nowadays to wander in wilderness is delightful to see. Thousands of tired, 
nerve-shaken, over-civilized people are beginning to find out that going to the mountains 
is going home; that wilderness is a necessity; and that mountain parks and reservations 
are useful not only as fountains of timber and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life. 
Awakening from the stupefying effects of the vice of over-industry and the deadly apathy 
of luxury, they are trying as best they can to mix and enrich their own little ongoings with 
those of Nature, and to get rid of rust and disease. (Muir 1901, xx) 
 
 These two views of the natural world began to blend and change with the emergence of ecology 
as a scientific discipline coupled with a growing realization that industrial chemicals could 
potentially have negative impacts on human as well as ecosystem health. 
While the intellectual thought behind modern environmentalism is tied to the ideals of 
conservation and preservation, the modern pollutants affecting today’s environment have origins 
in the Industrial Revolution. With it came not just concern about the potential disappearance of 
“wild” places to be appreciated for their natural beauty or the recreational opportunities they 
11 
 
provided, those places were now too being threatened by changes in air and water quality by the 
byproducts of ever expanding economies.  
Chemicals including sodium carbonate, potassium carbonate, hydrogen chloride, calcium 
sulfide, hydrogen sulfide, sulfuric acid, and others, were released into the air and waterways in a 
largely unregulated way, eventually leading to problems visible enough to generate concern over 
their potential public health consequences. Increased burning of coal led to smog in some cities, 
particularly in London where it mixed with their naturally occurring fog. By the 1800’s 
chemical-laden smog became increasingly problematic, even contributing to deaths. In 1873 
there was a 40 percent increase in the death rate in London that was attributed to particularly 
noxious smog that year.
11
 There was some early legislation in the United Kingdom designed to 
reduce the amount of air pollution including the Smoke Nuisance Abatement Act in 1853 and the 
Alkali Act in 1863, but major modern environmental protection measures would not be seen in 
Europe until a century later.  
 By the 1950s and 1960s it was becoming clear in both Europe and North America that 
industrial pollution was a growing concern to human and to the health of ecosystems.  
In the United States in October 1948, smog from two factories killed twenty residents of Donora, 
Pennsylvania and left many more ill.
12
 Water pollution was becoming increasingly severe in the 
Great Lakes region and some waterways were so polluted that they even caught fire. Probably 
the most infamous being the Cuyahoga River which caught on fire multiple times including in 
1868, 1883, 1887, 1912, 1922, 1936, 1941, 1948, 1952, and 1969 (Kehoe 1997).  
“The long history of economic activity in Europe has given rise to problems of air, soil 
and water which were more severe than those of the US. Scientific evidence pointed to the 
                                                          
11
 See http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/education/teens/case-studies/great-smog 
12
 See http://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/palitmap/DonoraSmog.html 
12 
 
worsening of these problems during the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the rapid growth and 
reconstruction of the European economies which took place following the Second World War” 
(Barnes and Barnes 1999, 26). In Europe smog was still a significant issue, and acid rain was 
beginning to cause noticeable damage in Sweden in particular. London’s “Killer Fog” of 
December 1952 lasted for four days that year, led to the deaths of approximately 4000 people, 
and left many more with chronic breathing problems.
13
 In Sweden the impact of acid rain began 
to increase and scientists found “between1962 and 1996 the wind-borne pollutants had increased 
the acidity of rainfall by a factor of eight” (Barnes and Barnes 1999, 26). This increase in the 
acidity of rain was particularly problematic because Swedish soil is low in calcium and therefore 
the “ecosystem was particularly sensitive to acidification, with much damage being done to 
forests, lakes and rivers” (26). While the Swedish government took action to reduce the domestic 
sources of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides that contributed to acid rain, the problem 
remained unsolved because the sources of these pollutants were not solely in Sweden. Due to 
wind patterns, pollutants from the UK, Germany and Poland were creating transboundary 
pollution problems for Sweden in the form of acid rain (27). Similarly, pollutants generated in 
the United States lead to acid rain in Canada leading to a transboundary pollution problem that 
could not be solved without the cooperation of both states.  
Pollution was becoming a more visible problem, and knowledge of its impacts was within 
the scientific community as well as among the general public. The amount of chemicals being 
developed and used commercially began to increase dramatically. “In 1947, the United States 
produced 124,259,000 pounds of chemical pesticides. Few people questioned the use of such 
deadly chemicals or their effect on the environment, and by 1960 the country was producing 
                                                          
13





637,666,000 pounds of DDT potent pesticides” (Klein 2011, 81). It was not until 1962, with the 
publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, that the general public became aware of the 
potential negative impact of the increased use of industrial chemicals. She described the potential 
problems of approving the use of new chemicals with unstudied effects in a tone that was urgent 
and in a style that was accessible to a general non-academic audience: 
The chemicals to which life is asked to make its adjustment are no longer merely the 
calcium and silica and copper and all the rest of the minerals washed out of the rocks and 
carried into the rivers to the sea; they are the synthetic creations of man’s inventive mind, 
brewed in his laboratories, and having no counterparts in nature. To adjust to these 
chemicals would require time on the scale that is nature’s; it would require not merely the 
years of a man’s life but the life of generations. And even this, were it by some miracle 
possible, would be futile, for the new chemicals come from our laboratories in an endless 
stream; almost five hundred annually find their way into actual use in the United States 
alone. The figure is staggering and its implications are not easily grasped—500 new 
chemicals to which the bodies of men and animals are required to somehow adapt each 
year, chemicals totally outside of the limits of biologic experience. (Carson 1962, 7) 
 
Carson described in detail how DDT accumulates in the food chain and causes long-term 
ecological problems. Carson also warned of the potential problems associated with reduction in 
biodiversity: 
Single-crop farming does not take advantage of the principles by which nature works; it 
is agriculture as an engineer might conceive it to be. Nature has introduced great variety 
into the landscape, but man has displayed a passion for simplifying it. Thus he undoes the 
built-in checks and balances by which nature holds the species within bounds. One 
important natural check is a limit on the amount of suitable habitat for each species. 
Obviously then, an insect that lives on wheat can build up its population to much higher 
levels on a farm devoted to wheat than one in which wheat is intermingled with other 
crops to which the insect is not adapted. (Carson 1962, 10) 
 
 Silent Spring represents a significant break with the past traditions of conservation and 
preservation by showing how these newer concerns were much border than those of 
conservation. “Environmental problems tended to be (a) more complex in origin, often stemming 
from new technologies; (b) have delayed, complex, and difficult to detect effects; and (c) have 
consequences for human health and well-being as well as for the natural environment” (Dunlap 
14 
 
and Mertig 1992). Carson’s work also had a substantive impact on policy when first, “individual 
states gradually banned DDT use, and in 1972 the federal government followed suit” (Klein 
2011, 84). 
Seeing and Solving the “Tragedy” 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s growing concerns about the consumption of natural 
resources combined with concerns about population growth, eventually leading to the concept 
and paradigm of sustainable development. In 1968, Garrett Hardin’s famous essay “The Tragedy 
of the Commons” appeared in the journal Science. Through the metaphor of a “pasture open to 
all”, Hardin described some of the fundamental difficulties that arise when managing common 
pool resources like environmental goods. He suggested that behavior that is rational for one 
individual in the short-term is irrational for all users of that resource over the long-term and 
warned that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (162). In 1971 Paul Ehrlich and John 
Holdren published another influential article in Science, one warning of the impacts of 
exponential population growth. In 1972 a study of the long-term consequences and causes of 
population growth was commissioned by a group known as the Club of Rome (Barnes and 
Barnes 1999). In 1974 Ehrlich and Holdren published an even more influential paper in 
American Scientist presenting the IPAT equation. They suggested that the relationship between 
human populations, development, and the environment could be calculated and that the addition 
of each additional person to the earth was a product of the average affluence of the community in 
which they would live and the technology available to offset the resources they would consume 





Environmentalism as a Social Movement and Institutionalization  
Focusing events like the Killer Fog, combined with increasing knowledge about ecology,  
the impact of industrial chemicals, concern over population growth and limited resources all led 
to a growing social movement in North America and Europe. It culminated with the creation of 
new legislation to reduce pollution and new institutions to enforce those laws. Concerns were 
growing not just in intellectual and academic communities but also among the general public. 
Public opinion surveys showed increasing levels of concern about environmental issues in the 
United States and between 1965 and 1970 responses indicating that “reducing pollution of air 
and water as one of the three problems to which they wanted the government to pay more 
attention” jumped from “17 to 53 percent” and this “increased attention to the environment 
culminated in the first Earth Day celebration on April 22, 1970. Some 20 million Americans took 
part” (Klein 2011, 90). At the same time new institutions were being created in the US and 
Europe to deal with environmental problems. In 1967 the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency was created, in 1970 the US Environmental Protection agency was established, and in 
1971 Denmark created a Ministry for Pollution Control. The European Community (forerunner 
of the EU) also made environmental issues a higher priority in the 1970s and 1980s and 
established an Environmental Action Programme in 1972. In 1981 it established a Directorate 
General for environment. By 1994 an EU-wide environmental institution, the European 
Environment Agency, had been established. New nongovernmental environmental organizations 
such as the League of Conservation Voters also sprung up; to this day it provides information to 
voters on US members of congress’ voting records on environmental issues illustrating that “by 
the 1970s, the environmental movement had matured and begun to effectively promote its cause” 
(Klein 2011, 91). 
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Parties with specifically pro-environment agendas, so-called green parties, were also 
being established and were beginning to influence in politics and policy-making. In 1972 a green 
party called Values was established in New Zealand and in 1973 a green party was established in 
the United Kingdom. In 1979 Daniel Brélaz was elected to the national parliament in 
Switzerland, becoming the first member of a green party to win a seat in an election (Klein 
2011). 
Climate Policy in the European Union 
Climate change first started to gain widespread attention as a global issue in 1988 when 
James Hanson testified before the United States Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee that warming due to the greenhouse effect would become an increasing problem, and 
when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established. The 1992 Earth Summit 
held in Rio de Janeiro marked the beginning of the international response to climate change. At 
the Rio Summit the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change established voluntary 
emissions reductions targets for its signatories. In 1997, partially in response to the minimal 
progress made toward meeting the voluntary standards set in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol was 
negotiated to set more stringent emissions targets. The EU has been actively pursuing Kyoto-
based policies and “As early as 1990, the EU voluntarily committed to stabilizing its emissions 
of CO₂ at the 1990 level by 2000” (EC Environment Fact Sheet, 3) and was successful in 
meeting those initial targets. The 15 countries that were EU member states at the time Kyoto was 
negotiated have committed to “to cutting off their combined emissions of the greenhouse gases 
controlled by the Protocol to 8% below the 1990 level by 2012. This overall target has been 
translated into a specific legally binding target for each member state based on its capacity to 
curb emissions. Most of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004 also have reduction targets 
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of 6-8%” (EC Environment Fact Sheet 2005, 3). To facilitate meeting these targets, the European 
Climate Change Programme (ECCP) was established by the commission in 2000.  
The EU 15 signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol which went into effect on February 16, 
2005, and committed the participating countries to reducing their collective greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) by 8 percent. In order to meet these targets, the creation of a European market 
for carbon emissions trading was proposed in 2001 by the ECCP and on October 13, 2003 was 
formally adopted by the European Council and the Parliament, creating the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The EU ETS regulates the emissions of over 10,000 
specific facilities that are point source emitters of GHGs. These installations include oil 
refineries, combustion plants, iron and steel plants, coke ovens, and factories producing cement, 
glass, lime, brick, ceramics, pulp and paper. The legal framework of the EU ETS does not 
explicitly outline how or where allowance trading takes place, so individual companies can trade 
allowances through a broker, bank or directly with each other.  
Individual member states are responsible for producing National Allocation Plans (NAP) 
that establish the total amounts of CO₂ emissions allowances that will be allocated, and available 
for trade within the state. The Commission must then assess the country’s NAP to ensure that the 
Plan will facilitate the meeting of the emissions reduction goals established for the state, and that 
the NAP is not in violation of the EU Treaty. Each individual member state is also required to 
establish a National Registry, through which records of all transactions involving the buying and 
selling of emissions permits, as well as records of the total amount of emissions produced by 
each regulated installation are kept. The information from each individual registry is then 
combined into the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL), which compiles data for all 
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emissions trading activities in all 27 member states as well as activities in Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
and Norway. 
The European Environment Agency (EEA) is responsible for compiling and verifying 
GHG emissions of EU member states, compiling the data into an annual GHG emissions report 
that is then submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 
EEA is also responsible for monitoring member states’ overall progress towards Kyoto GHG 
reduction targets.  
Some early examinations of the effectiveness of implementation and compliance of EU 
environmental policies yielded disappointing results. Krislov et al. found that there was a 
“growing problem of compliance” across multiple areas of EU law. A 1992 report of the EU's 
Court of Auditors found that implementation of environmental directives was slow, and that a 
"significant gap between the set of rules in force and their actual application" existed (1986, 68). 
Bourzel (2000) found “considerable variation, not only between states but also between different 
policies within one state” (158) and that some states exceed EU environmental regulations, while 
others are unable to meet them. Jordan’s (1998) findings also illustrated variation in member 
states’ implementation and compliance with environmental regulations. Haigh (1999) and 
Sbragia (1999), however, suggest that implementation and compliance may not be as large of a 
problem in regard to climate change policies, but in order “To pass the test with confidence both 
'implementation' and 'integration' will have to be taken more seriously” (Haigh 1999, 111). This 
indeed does seem to be the case; especially when considering that in 2007 the European 
Commission established new guidelines for monitoring and reporting GHG emissions. These 
guidelines were designed to improve regulation and compliance in the EU-ETS. These new 
regulations took effect January 1, 2008. Another potential difficulty that the EU-ETS could face 
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is variation in member states capacity to track and report GHG emissions accurately. The 
Community Independent Transaction Log is intended to provide “standards to ensure 
compatibility of the national systems with one another and with the European policies” (Voβ 
207, 339) and the European Environment Agency is responsible for compiling and verifying 
GHG emissions of EU member states. It is difficult to say if these measures have done enough to 
ensure reliability in reporting emissions.  
Overall, considering that 2005-2007 was intended to be a trial period designed to 
“develop the infrastructure and to provide the experience to enable the successful use of a cap-
and-trade system to limit European GHG emissions in 2008-12 and beyond” (Ellerman and 
Joskow 2008, 45), the EU-ETS appears to be very successful. As of 2006, France, Greece, 
Sweden, UK, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia had already met their Kyoto emissions targets (see Table 1). The only countries that 
were then projected to miss their Kyoto targets were Denmark, Italy and Spain. Within a 
relatively short period of time, “the EU ETS has evolved from being an engaging possibility in 
the 2000 Green Paper (EC, 2000) to being what is now regularly characterized as the flagship of 










Chapter 3: Emissions Trading as an Environmental Policy Mechanism 
Environmental Policy Mechanism Selection  
Environmental policies can impose economic and costs on governments, businesses and 
individual citizens, and can also impose political costs on those who support such policies and 
regulations. Often, it can be difficult to convince actors that environmental protection is in their 
best interest, and when actors are certain that it is not in their best interest, it can be especially 
difficult to obtain their compliance or cooperation with a particular policy. Environmentalists 
face many challenges when constructing and implementing policies to meet their goals including 
how to overcome Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons,” how to place price on the benefits of good 
environmental quality as well as the price of the negative impacts of pollution, and how to 
surmount the short-term bias in the policy making-process. 
In his 1968 essay, Garrett Hardin outlines one of the most fundamental difficulties facing 
those who manage common pool resources, including natural resources. Using the example of a 
“pasture open to all,” Hardin suggest that behavior that is rational for one individual in the short 
term, is irrational for all users of that resource over the long-term.  In his example, a herdsman 
will ask “what is the utility to me to add one more animal to my herd” and thus, each herdsman 
will continue to add animals to their individual herds, until the pasture is so over grazed that it 
becomes useless to all. Williams (1999) also discusses the difficulty of managing common pool 
resources, focusing specifically on air. Williams argues that since air is a public good, it is 
especially difficult for the market to provide sufficient mechanisms and incentives to prevent its 
pollution. Therefore, Williams suggests, the government may be better equipped to regulate air 
quality, but may also face pressures from business interests and some voters to reduce levels of 
regulation, especially when those groups are incurring the costs of the regulation through taxes.  
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An additional difficulty that policy makers face when justifying the adoption of 
environmental policies comes in the form of how to accurately calculate the costs and benefits of 
a given policy. How does one go about quantifying what clean air or clean water is worth or how 
much the negative impact of polluted water would cost? Pareto (1920) argues that a change is 
efficient if it leads to at least one individual being better off, and no single individual being left 
worse off. While Pareto efficiency may be impossible to meet, the alternative criterion proposed 
by Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939) may be more attainable. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion proposes 
that changes can be defined as welfare improving if the individuals who gain from a particular 
change could potentially compensate individuals who lose for the full costs that they incur from 
that change. This is seen as efficient if, once the winners have compensated the losers, at least 
one winner is still better off because of the change. In short, the social costs of the change should 
be smaller than its social benefits. These two theoretical criteria are perhaps more easily applied 
when the costs and benefits of an action can be easily calculated, but calculating the costs and 
benefits of environmental policies can be particularly difficult because there is often 
disagreement over how much good environmental quality and its benefits are worth, both in the 
present and future.  
Revesz and Stavins (2004) examine several potential methods for calculating values for 
these costs and benefits, including the methods of contingent averting behavior, hedonic pricing, 
travel-cost models, contingent valuation, and societal revealed preferences. Beyond the basic 
desire for a policy’s social benefits exceeding its social costs, many authors have developed 
criteria to be utilized when selecting policies. Goulder and Parry (2008) argue that environmental 
policies should be cost effective, exhibit distributional equity of program costs and benefits, 
minimize risk despite uncertainty of costs and benefits, and be politically feasible to adopt and 
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implement. Revesz and Stavins (2004) argue that the policy instrument selected should also be 
able to meet the goal or standard being proposed, establish a reporting process that provide the 
government with any information it needs, encourage and provide for research that could 
improve pollution abatement, and adapt to using any new, more efficient technologies that 
emerge. The United States Congressional Office of Technology Assessment also recommends 
that policies chosen should place a minimal burden on government, be adaptable to local 
contexts, prevent pollution from occurring when possible, and consider environmental justice 
issues.  
 While these criteria are helpful, it is rare that each and every one will be met in a 
democratic system. Interest groups that represent industry and those that represent environmental 
groups often have different policy preferences. Some groups may be overrepresented in the 
political process, while others are underrepresented. This can be due to differences in the 
financial resources they have available, or due to collective action dilemmas. In addition, policy 
makers have their own sets of policy preferences and goals that may differ from what their 
constituents would prefer. Fenno (1973) argues that legislator’s have three primary goals: 
reelection, maximizing their power within the chamber, and crafting good public policy. 
Mayhew (1974) argues that reelection is a representatives primary concern and that they cannot 
achieve secondary goals like maximizing power within the chamber and crafting good public 
policy unless they are first reelected. Policy makers are also dealing with incomplete and 
imperfect information and may not be able to maximize all of the above criteria simply because 
they do not have the information that would let them know which policy would be most cost 
effective or best minimize risk. Institutional effects may also inhibit or enhance policy making in 
a democratic setting. The United States Army Corps of Engineers is still frequently criticized for 
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having too strict of a bureaucratic culture that tends to ignore the needs and benefits of healthy 
ecosystems  
Kingdon (1989) argues that environmental policy creation is contingent upon the flow 
and timing of events. This is counter to Easton’s (1965) model of policy creation which views 
the policy-making process as a system of distinct steps where inputs feed in to government 
decision making and a policy is then created. Kingdon suggests that before a policy can be 
adopted and implemented three “policy streams”—problem, policy, and political—should 
converge. The policy stream consists of identification of a policy or mechanism to address the 
problem. The politics stream consists of enough political concern over the problem, and the 
political feasibility of the adoption and implementation of the policy that can fix it. Kingdon 
argues that it is not always necessary for all three streams to converge, but at least two must, and 
the best policy making occurs when all three converge.  
Types of Environmental Policy Instruments  
There are two primary types of environmental policy instruments; market-based, and 
command-and-control. Command-and-control policies are those where regulations are 
established by a central government, or government agency, and polluters are then forced to meet 
those established requirements. Revesz and Stavins (2004) argue that these types of policies are 
too inflexible, that they impose a similar burden of pollution control across all firms, regardless 
of costs, and that they can lead to significant inefficiencies (where costs of reducing pollution are 
higher than they would be if market-based incentives were utilized instead). Command-and-
control regulations can also be technology forcing, requiring that all polluters to adopt the same 
technological means for reducing levels of pollution. An example of this would be requiring 
facilities to install pollution scrubbers. This type of technology forcing can be a problem since it 
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does not allow firms any flexibility in the way in which they reduce emissions, and since it does 
not allow for the creation or use of new technologies that might work better and or be more cost 
effective. Another major limitation of command-and-control policies is that they often ignore the 
differences in local contexts, both in terms of socio-economic factors and in terms of differences 
in the natural environment where they are being implemented. 
According to Revesz and Stavins (2004), market-based policy instruments are designed 
to “harness market forces” and create financial incentives for firms to reduce emissions, or to 
alter consumer demand so that it leads to changes that reduce emissions. The idea of pollution 
charges was first developed by Pigou (1920) who argued that polluters should be forced to 
“internalize” the full cost of their emissions, and proposed that it should take the form of a tax on 
emitters. Revesz and Stavins (2004) claim that the closest example to a true Pigovian tax that has 
been used in the US is the unit-charge used in some jurisdictions on the disposal of household 
solid waste. This has also been referred to as a “pay-as-you-throw” program. Market friction 
reduction policies are designed either to create markets that did not previously exist, or to 
enhance the functioning of markets and allow the invisible hand to work unhindered. Examples 
of market friction reduction include information and product labeling policies (like the  US 
EPA’s Energy Star Program) that are designed to provide more information to consumers and 
alter consumer demand patterns. Government subsidies are, to Revesz and Stavins (2004) the 
mirror image of taxes, and can encourage entry into the market, and increase firms profit levels. 
The authors also argue that while subsidies can encourage growth in new, potentially 
environmentally friendly areas (like solar and wind power), they more often than not lead to 
inefficiencies that can also cause environmental harm. The authors generally do not recommend 
their use, and suggest that subsidy reductions can lead to environmental benefits. An example of 
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this would be lowering the subsidies on domestic production of fossil fuels which Revesz and 
Stavins argue could lead to significant reductions in CO₂ emissions in the United States. Liability 
rules force firms to pay for the negative impact of the pollution they create. An example of their 
retroactive use can be seen in the case of Exxon being held liable and forced to pay for damages 
caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound. In that case contingent valuation 
was used to help calculate the costs that should be paid.  
Emissions Trading as an Environmental Policy Mechanism  
Several authors, including Coase (1960), Dales (1968), and Montgomery (1972), have 
proposed theoretical arguments for creating “markets” to manage pollutants as a viable policy 
option for abatement. Relying on this early theoretical work, the US Environmental Protection 
Agency was one of the first government agencies in the world to utilize this new type of policy 
tool and designed several programs based on creating markets for specific pollutants. The United 
States Acid Rain Program, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, and the NOx Budget 
Program all included emissions trading schemes as mechanisms for reducing sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides. These programs were seen as successful in achieving desired emissions 
reductions while being more cost effective than other abatement mechanisms. Voß argues that 
the US Acid Rain Program is an extremely successful example of how well trade-able permit 
systems can work and a 2005 report by the Pew Center for Global Climate Change argued that 
well-designed trade-able permits systems can lower the costs of pollution abatement by up to 50 
percent. According to Revesz and Stavins (2004), emissions-trading is the most commonly used 
market-based system for pollution control in the US.  
Emissions-trading allows firms more flexibility in how they choose to meet their targets, 
rather than imposing predetermined technologies or standards as a command-and-control would. 
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Polluters who are able to reduce their emissions to levels lower than their targets can sell their 
excess emissions to others who are not in compliance. Polluters who generate more emissions 
than allowed are forced to pay for excess emissions, creating an economically efficient solution 
(Pew 2005). The findings of Baron and Plilibert (2005), Tietenberg (1985) and Dales (1968), 
also suggest that emissions trading is the most cost-effective way of controlling emissions, 
regardless of the level of reductions to be enforced.   
The European Union Emissions Trading System. The European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) was proposed in 2001 and on October 13, 2003 was formally adopted 
by the European Council and the Parliament. The EU ETS first phase began on January 1, 2005, 
and became the first cap-and-trade system in the world to regulate carbon dioxide. The EU ETS 
regulates the CO₂ emissions of over 11,500 specific facilities across the EU. The facilities 
included in the program represent nearly half of the EU’s CO₂ emissions14 and include oil 
refineries, iron and steel plants, combustion plants, coke ovens, and factories that produce 
cement, glass, lime, brick, ceramics, paper, and pulp. All 27 member states participate in the EU 
ETS and are responsible for producing National Allocation Plans that establish within each state 
the total amounts of emissions that will be allocated, and available for trade. This study will 
examine the EU-ETS across two different units of analysis: the EU level, and the member-state 
level. This will facilitate comparison of the EU ETS to other GHG cap-and-trade programs, as 
well as facilitate comparison across EU member states.  
 
  








Chapter 4: The European Union Emissions Trading System 
Domestic Influences on Climate and Environmental Policy  
Individual state preferences for strong or weak environmental regulation, combined with 
other contextual factors like levels of corruption and energy production, all influence states’ 
capacity and desire to reduce their emissions. Some member states simply have a longer history, 
and greater degree of institutionalization, of environmental protection than others. For example, 
many countries established their environmental agency around the same time, in the late 1960s 
or early 1970s (Jӓncke 2002), while others like Portugal, Spain, and Greece all lacked an 
environmental ministry prior to their entering the EU (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 5). 
Public Opinion on Climate Change in the EU. Relative to public opinion in the United 
States, Europeans seem to exhibit more overall concern about climate change. According to a 
2008 Special Eurobarometer Survey, Europeans on average (about 75 percent) view climate 
change as a very serious problem. Pew (2008) reports that in the U.S. only 44 percent of 
Americans felt that climate change was a “very serious problem,” as compared to 59 percent in 
the United Kingdom, which was the lowest percentage of any member state. Member states that 
had the highest percentage of respondents agree that climate change is a “very serious problem” 
included Cypress (96 percent), Greece (95 percent), Slovenia (89 percent) and Malta (88 
percent). In the EU, those respondents most likely to agree that climate change is a very serious 
problem are in the 25 to 54 age group, and better educated. The effect of partisanship was 
relatively small, with differences ranging from 80 percent of individuals on the left, 73 percent in 
the center and 74 percent on the right.  
Ideology. In the United States, liberal Democrats are most likely to be supportive of 
strong environmental policies and are also more likely to support climate change policy 
28 
 
(Lindamen and Haider-Markel 2002; Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 2008). Republicans are 
most likely to oppose environmental policy, be unsupportive of climate policy, and less likely to 
believe in climate change as an anthropogenic phenomenon. Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 
(2008) find that in the United States, “the strongest predictors of environmental policy 
preferences are political attributes” and that “Republicans and ideologically conservative 
individuals, controlling for their trust in government, are substantially less supportive of further 
government effort to address environmental issues” (1067). 
In Europe, Green parties tend to fall on the left end of the political spectrum. ParlGov.org 
provides Left/Right scores for political parties on a one-to-ten scale. Political parties rated with 
lower numbers are more liberal and left leaning, while parties rated with higher numbers are 
more conservative and right leaning. The Green party in Germany, for example, has a Left/Right 
score of 2.9. Cabinets that are composed of more left-leaning parties should be more likely to be 
supportive of environmental and climate policies. 
Compliance to Past EU Policies. The number of formal actions against a member state 
in the European Union can act as an indicator of how well a member state has been complying 
with existing environmental regulations. Camyar (2007) examined the compliance record of the 
EU member states to various EU policies and suggested that compliance records are directly 
influenced by the preferences of domestic actors. Camyar also compiled a dataset of all formal 
infringement actions taken against individual member states across multiple policy areas, 
including environmental policy. 
Energy Policy. Since the use of fossil fuels can directly lead to increased emissions of 
CO₂, climate and energy policy can be closely related. The particular mix of fuel sources used in 
a country has direct implications for the total amount of GHGs they produce. It is important to 
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again note that the EU ETS includes emissions from oil refineries and coal combustion plants. 
Countries that are intentionally replacing coal or oil with renewable energy sources for domestic 
electricity generation would also likely be reducing their emissions from oil refineries and coal 
plants. However, member states that are large producers of oil would be unlikely to face pressure 
to reduce production even if domestic demand for oil decreases, given the continued growing 
demand in other regions of the world. Oil companies have resources to protect their interests. 
They have direct incentives to support policies that protect the oil industry politically, and 
oppose policies seen to potentially harm it, like efforts to reduce emissions levels.  In 
representative democracies with low levels of corruption, this can occur in the form of lobbying 
and interest groups.  In more corrupt countries, this can take the form of payments to politicians 
to influence the direction of policy, or payments to regulators to overlook non-compliance. 
Wilson and Damania (2005) find evidence of this influence in environmental policy, specifically 
in cases of resource extraction, like forestry. They suggest that “the large rents associated with 
resource extraction can be used to evade environmental regulations in a number of ways” (516). 
Specifically, the authors note that the “surpluses can be used to influence policies through the 
payment of political contributions to policy makers. Alternatively, environmental regulations can 
be evaded by paying bribes to lower-level bureaucrats who are responsible for administering 
policies” (516). 
Corruption. Levels of political corruption can have an impact on the quality and efficacy 
of environmental policy (Lopez and Mitra 2000; Fredriksson and Svensson 2003; Barbier et al. 
2005; Wilson and Damania 2005; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006a; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006b; 
Woods 2008; Fredriksson and Wollscheild 2010). Woods finds that in the context of the United 
States, those “states with higher levels of political corruption also have significantly weaker 
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environmental programs,” and this effect is strongest in “states with strong organized 
manufacturing interests” (Woods 2008, 259). In a comparative study of over forty countries, 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006a) also found a relationship between corruption and environmental 
policy. They conclude that high levels of corruption are correlated with lower levels of 
environmental protection and that environmental policies are most stringent when countries are 
highly democratic and have low levels of political corruption. There is some evidence that the 
impact of corruption may be lessened or intensified depending on other political factors, 
including political competition and party discipline. Wilson and Damania (2005) find a linkage 
between the levels of political competition and environmental policy and suggest that “higher 
levels of political competition will lead to the adoption of more stringent environmental policy 
and higher fines for evading their effects” (528). Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2010) find that in 
countries with low levels of corruption, high levels of party discipline can “be expected to raise 
the stringency of environmental policies and reduce pollution problems,” but that “when the 
level of corruption is high, party discipline may enable national party officials to reduce the 
stringency of environmental policy in exchange for favors” (507). 
Post-Communism. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006b) note that the ten new member states 
that joined the EU in 2004 generally had lower levels of income, higher levels of corruption and 
lower environmental standards than the other countries that were already members of the EU. 
Most of these new member states were post-communist countries where the governments had 
seen the environment solely as a source of resources for human needs without any intrinsic value 
(Mazurski 1991). Post-communist countries also generally lagged significantly behind EU 
standards, both in environmental legislation and institutional capacity to manage the environment 
(Scrieciu and Stringer 2008). In addition, they tend to exhibit a weak civil society, and therefore 
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little demand from organized environmental interests to advocate for policy (Howard 2002). 
There is also some evidence that relative to other EU member states, citizens residing in post-
communist countries are less worried generally about environmental issues. Nistor (2010) finds 
that there continues to be a “dichotomy that citizens of post-communist, now EU member states 
are still less environmentally concerned compared to the old member states’ citizens especially 
in terms of behavior” (147). 
GDP. The relationship between environmental protection and quality and per capita GDP 
can vary considerably depending on the type of environmental issue. “The statistical result is 
somewhat paradoxical or ambivalent, because GDP per capita correlates with environmental 
improvements in some fields, but with deterioration in others” (Jӓnicke 2002, 11). In regard to 
the larger picture, wealthier countries that experience high levels of development and a good 
quality of life may have more resources to commit to environmental protection. Inglehart (1997) 
argues that only after a country has “Modernized” can it then turn its attention to other, 
“Postmaterialist” issues like environmental protection. Similarly, Ringquist suggests that when 
other societal needs are already met, wealthier countries can “both demand and afford stronger 
environmental measures” (1993b, 107). Natural resource degradation (like deforestation) can 
impact poorer nations more severely than wealthier ones, as issues related to heavy 
industrialization can lead to other types of environmental problems. However, patterns are not 
always clear and can be complicated by numerous economic pressures from within, and external 
to, national economies. There is potential, that in the case of carbon emissions, wealthier 
countries may have more capacity to reduce emissions, but also more capacity to produce 
emissions. Higher levels of income that facilitate higher levels of production and consumption of 
goods can lead to larger carbon footprints.  
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Political Parties. Jensen and Spoon (2011) examine the role of political parties in EU 
member states meeting their Kyoto emissions targets, and find that member states with green 
parties in government are more likely to meet their targets over time. They also found that 
countries with more parties giving “higher priority to the environment in their manifestos” were 
more likely to meet their targets, and that that was especially true when those parties were in a 
state’s governing coalition (110). Tranter and Western (2009) suggest that Green parties 
facilitate and enhance the spread of postmaterialist values by acting as “socializing agents that 
influence the formation of value priorities” (150), especially among younger voters. Tranter and 
Western also argue that “political parties do not simply reflect public opinion; their actions 
actively shape opinions and behaviors” (149). This argument that the opinions of political elites 
influence public opinion, particularly when the public is relatively uninformed about a given 
issue, has been made by other authors including Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991; and 
Zaller 1992. The opposite argument has also been made; that it is in fact, public opinion 
influencing the positions parties are taking (Stimpson 1991, Carruba 2001). This argument has 
been referred to as the “policy mood” approach and suggests that political elites, who desire to 
be reelected, will shift their position on issues to respond to the policy preferences of their 
constituents. 
Data and Methods 
The following analysis utilizes two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models and 
two logistic regression models to examine the influences on levels of CO₂ emissions produced 
by facilities regulated under the EU ETS from 2005-2010. The first two models examine 
influences on the verified CO₂ emissions produced by member states. The second set of models 
uses logistic regression to examine influences on member states’ capacity to meet their CO₂ 
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emissions targets. In the tables in the results section below, the coefficients and standard errors 
are reported. Standard error is a measure of how robust, or reliable, the estimates in the model 
are. The larger the standard error, the less reliable the results are. In OLS regression, the 
coefficients represent the amount of change in the dependent variable you would see for a one-
unit change in the independent variable. In logit analysis, coefficients are a measure of the 
magnitude of the effect that the given independent variable has on the dependent variable.  
Dependent Variables. The dependent variables used in the analyses are Verified 
Emissions and Targets. Verified Emissions is a measure of the amount of CO₂ emissions 
produced per capita by all of the facilities within a member state by all facilities regulated under 
the EU ETS. Targets is a dummy variable indicating if a member state has met their emissions 
targets for CO₂ reduction or not. 
Independent Variables. Measures of corruption, public opinion on climate change, 
renewable energy production, oil production, green parties in government, cabinet ideology, 
length of EU membership, green party representation in the European Parliament, past 
infringement, gross domestic product, and post-communism are all examined.  
 The variables used in the following analysis were compiled from a variety of sources into 
an original dataset. Data was gathered primarily by accessing information available online, with 
the exception of the Infringement variable, which was acquired by emailing Dr. Isa Camyar who 
created the larger dataset from which it was constructed. Sources include various EU bodies 
including Eurostat, the Community Independent Transaction Log, and Eurobarometer; one 
United States governmental agency (the Energy Information Agency); one non-governmental 
agency (Transparency International); and two other pre-existing datasets (Parlgov.org and 
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Camyar’s (2007) infringement dataset). Table 4.1 includes a description and source of each 
variable in the dataset.                                                             
Table 4.1: European Union Climate Change Policy Dataset, Variables and Sources 
 Variable Name  Source    Description 
  
Verified Emissions  Community Independent  This variable is a per capita measure of the 
   Transaction Log, Eurostat  amount of CO₂ emissions produced within a  
member state per year at facilities regulated 
by the European Union Emissions Trading 





Targets     Community Independent  This variable indicates if a member state has 
   Transaction Log, Eurostat  met their CO₂ emissions targets for that  
year. Coded 1 if a member state met their 
emissions targets producing fewer emissions 
than allocated. Coded 0 if they exceeded 
their targets producing more emissions than 
allocated. Data available at:  
        http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/ ; 
        http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ 
portal/eurostat/home/ 
 
Corruption    Transparency International  This variable is the corruption perception   
        index compiled by Transparency  
        International, and is available at:  
        http://cpi.transparency.org 
 
Public Opinion   Euroabarometer    Percentage of respondents who responded  
        “A very serious problem” to the question  
        “how serious a problem do you think global  
        warming / climate change is at the  
        moment?” From Special Eurobarometer  
        300. Survey details and results available at:  
        http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ 
eb_special_en.ht 
 
Renewable Energy  Energy Information Agency, This is a per capita measure of the total  
  Eurostat    amount of energy produced per country, 
      per year, in billions of kilowatt-hours from  











(Table 4.1 cont’d.) 
 
Oil Production   Energy Information Agency,  This is a per-capita measure of oil  
  Eurostat    production in thousands of barrels per day,  







Green in Government   Parliament and Government This variable is a measure of whether or not 
    Composition Database, Holger a green party is a member of the  
    Döring and Philip Manow,  cabinet. Data available at: 
    University of Bremen  http://parlgov.org 
 
 
Cabinet Ideology   Parliament and Government This variable is a measure of government  
  Composition Database, Holger ideology, which is calculated by aggregating  
Döring and Philip Manow,  data on individual party ideology for parties   
University of Bremen in the cabinet by year. Data available at:  
http://parlgov.org  
 
Green Party in EP   Parliament and Government This variable is a measure of the number of  
    Composition Database, Holger of seats held by green party members of  the  
    Döring and Philip Manow, European Parliament, by country and year. 
    University of Breman  
 
Length of Membership    This variable indicates how long a state has  
been a member of the EU in number of 
years. 
        
Infringement     Dr. Isa Camyar   This variable will provide a measure of 
    University of Pennsylvania  member state’s record of compliance with  
        past EU environmental directives. Dataset 
available by contacting Dr. Camyar at  
        icamyar@sas.upenn.edu 
 
Post-Communist       This variable indicates if a country is a  
        former Communist state. Non-communist  
        states are coded 0, post-communist states are  
        coded 1. 
 
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses in this chapter. 
When applicable, the country where the highest and lowest observations for a given variable 





Table 4.2: European Union Climate Change Policy Dataset, Descriptive Statistics 
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The models below will test the following hypotheses:  
Corruption. Previous work suggests that countries with higher levels of political 
corruption also tend to have poorer environmental records (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006a; 
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Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006b; Woods 2008). Given this, higher corruption levels may also 
influence performance of states in reducing their carbon emissions.  
H1: As levels of political corruption increase, amounts of verified emissions will increase. 
H2: As levels of political corruption increase, member states will be less likely to meet their 
emissions targets. 
 Public Opinion. Public opinion may influence political elites, pressuring them to adopt 
the positions and policies preferred by the individuals responsible for their reelection (Stimson 
1991, Carruba 2001).  
H3: As public concern towards global warming as a serious issue increases, amounts of verified 
emissions will decrease. 
H4: As public concern towards global warming as a serious issue increases, member states will 
be more likely to meet their emissions targets. 
Renewable Energy and Oil Production. Energy produced from renewable sources can 
reduce the amount of emissions produced in a country.  When renewable energy sources are 
available and when reliance on renewable energy is encouraged, there is likely to be a reduced 
reliance on fossil fuels.  Countries that have a well-developed renewable energy industry, or are 
currently investing to develop the production of  renewables, also have organized interests that 
promote and protect the renewable energy industry. 
H5: As the amount of energy produced from renewable sources increases, verified emissions will 
decrease. 
H6: As the amount of energy produced from renewable sources increases, member states will be 
more likely to meet their emissions targets.  
38 
 
 The opposite seems to be true in countries that produce significant quantities of oil. These 
states are less likely to have policies that provide incentives that would promote the use of 
renewable energy sources instead of oil.  Such countries would have organized interests that 
would oppose policies discouraging the use of fossil fuels with large carbon footprints. 
H7: As domestic oil production increases, verified emissions will increase. 
H8: As domestic oil production increases, member states will be less likely to meet their 
emissions targets. 
 Green Parties. Since green parties are explicitly pro-environmental, one would expect 
that the better their representation within a country, the more likely a country would be to adhere 
to EU environmental and climate policy.   
H9: If a green party is a member of the government, verified emissions will decrease. 
H10: When green parties are members of the government, member states will be more likely to 
meet their emissions targets. 
H11: As the number of a country’s seats held by a green party in the European Parliament 
increases, verified emissions will decrease. 
H12: As the number of a country’s seats held by a green party in the European Parliament 
increases, member states are more likely to meet their emissions targets. 
 Cabinet Ideology. Green parties tend to be rated as left on the political spectrum, and 
environmental protection is often associated with liberalism (Lindamen and Haider-Markel 2002; 
Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 2008). 
H13: As government ideology becomes more left-leaning, verified emissions will decrease. 
H14: As government ideology becomes more left-leaning, countries will be more likely to meet 
their emissions targets. 
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 Past Infringement. A member state’s past record of compliance to EU environmental 
regulations is likely a reflection of their overall commitment to adhering to EU environmental 
standards. 
H15: Countries with higher incidence rates of past infringement to environmental policy will 
have higher levels of verified emissions.  
H16: Countries with higher incidence rates of past infringement to environmental policy will be 
less likely to meet their emissions targets.  
Results  
In the first OLS regression model examining verified CO₂ emissions per capita (see 
Table 4.3) Corruption, Renewable Energy, Cabinet Ideology, Length of Membership, GDP, 
Post-Communist, and the interaction term, Length*Corruption, all have statistically significant 
effects.  
Table 4.3: Influences on Verified Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Capita 
N = 154 
Prob  > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.3741 
*p>.10, **p>.05, ***p>.001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
 Coefficient SE 
Corruption [-]             1.463492*** 0.2378705 
Public Opinion [-]            -0.0163761                       0.021989 
Renewable Energy [-]            -0.9225683***                       0.0939313 
Oil Production [+]           -13.97289                          9.532281 
Green in Government [-]            -0.1629097 0.4716856 
Cabinet Ideology [+]             0.2574416*     0.1391064 
Length of Membership      0.1534532 ***        0.0404476 
Green Party in EP [-]             0.1092365    0.0685415 
GDP   0.0000473** 0.0000149 
Post-Communist             1.205369** 0.5369823 
Length*Corruption             -0.0337108*** 0.0064821 
Constant            -3.477226                          2.440735 
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Corruption is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction as predicted in H1 (see 
Figure 4.1). A decrease in corruption is associated with an increase in emissions (higher scores 
indicating lower levels of corruption). The predicted values suggest that, holding all other 
variablesat their means, countries with the lowest corruption (near a CPI score of 9) have per 
capita emissions near seven tonnes of CO₂, while those that are the most corrupt (with scores 
near 4) would have emissions levels about half of that amount. Most of the countries in the EU 
with higher levels of corruption are post-communist, and even when this and GDP are taken into 




Figure 4.1: Predicted Values of Verified Emissions Per Capita for Corruption 
Renewable energy is significant in the direction predicted supporting H5; as the amount 
of energy produced from renewable sources increases, verified emissions will decrease (see 
                                                          
1515
 When the model includes only post-communist countries, dropping all other EU member states corruption is no 
longer significant. The interaction term, length*corruption also loses statistical significance. However, in that model 
public opinion, oil production, green in government all have significant effects.   
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Figure 4.2). Though it is not possible for CO₂ emissions to be negative, the overall trend 
indicated by the predicted values shows a strong pattern of significant reduction in emissions per 
person as renewable energy production increases.  
 
Figure 4.2: Predicted Values of Verified Emissions Per Capita for Renewable Energy 
Cabinet ideology reaches statistical significance, and as suggested by H13, as the average 
liberalism of a cabinet increases, their verified emissions levels decrease. Length of membership 
is also significant. The longer a country has been in the EU, the higher their emissions are per-
capita.  
The independent effect of length of membership on verified emissions is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that the longer a country has been an EU member, the higher 
their emissions. However, the effect of length of membership is also dependent upon corruption. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates predicted values of verified emissions per capita for a range of values of 




Figure 4.3: Predicted Values of Verified Emissions Per Capita for Length of Membership 
GDP also has a statistically significant effect. As GDP increases, so do emissions levels. 
The interaction term, Length*Corruption, is also statistically significant. Post-communism has a 
surprising significant effect. Post-communist states are more likely to reduce emissions than 
states that never experienced communism. Public Opinion and Green in Government had effects 
in the predicted direction, but did not reach statistical significance. Green Party representation in 
the European Parliament and domestic oil production levels also lacked significance in this 
model. 
 Model 2 is also an OLS regression model examining verified emissions per capita, but 
controls for a member state’s previous record of complying with other EU environmental 
policies (see Table 4.4). It is important to note that this model includes only the EU 15. Past 
infringement, Corruption, Renewable Energy, Oil Production, Length of Membership, and 
Length*Corruption all have statistically significant effects.  Public Opinion, Green in 
Government, Cabinet Ideology, Green in EP, and GDP all fail to reach levels of statistical 
significance. The results indicate that higher numbers of past infringement actions are associated 
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with lower levels of emissions. This effect is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction 
than that predicted by H15. 
Table 4.4: Past Infringement and Verified Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Capita 
 
N = 90 
Prob  > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.5556 
*p>.10, **p>.05, ***p>.001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
In this model, Corruption has a significant, positive effect. Countries that are more corrupt are 
associated with lower levels of carbon emissions. This is opposite of the effect predicted by H1. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the predicted values for corruption at different levels of emissions per 
capita, holding all other variables at their mean. As countries become less corrupt, verified 
emissions per capita increase. This effect is the same as in Model 1, but the magnitude of the 
effect is smaller. Countries that are the most corrupt, with a Corruption Perception Index of 4, 
are predicted to produce two tonnes of CO₂ per person, while the least corrupt countries (with 
corruption scores of nine) have CO₂ emissions of about 3 tonnes per person. Renewable energy 
use also has the same effect as in Model 1, providing additional evidence that as renewable 
energy use increases, verified emissions decrease, supporting H5 (see Figure 4.5).  
 Coefficient SE 
Infringement [+] -0.0285063***                         0.0053388 
Corruption [-] 1.062388 **                     0.3804962 
Public Opinion [-]               0.0163711                     0.0255494 
Renewable Energy [-]              -1.02941***                     0.1193653 
Oil Production [+]            -17.43542**                     6.183592 
Green in Government [-]               0.3257044                     0.3144183 
Cabinet Ideology [+]              -0.1680222 0.1075313  
Length of Membership               0.1896337** 0.0598402 
Green Party in EP [-]  0.1005218                     0.0684848 
GDP              0.0000109                     0.0000129 
Length*Corruption -0.0340727***                     0.0083003 




Figure 4.4: Model 2 Predicted Values of Verified Emissions Per Capita for Corruption 
 
Figure 4.5: Model 2 Predicted Values of Verified Emissions Per Capita for Renewable 
Energy 
 
Surprisingly, in Model 2, increasing domestic oil production is associated with 
decreasing emissions. This effect is opposite of that predicted by H7. This seems counterintuitive 
given that oil production and use is an obvious source of CO₂ emissions, and countries that are 
large oil producers should face political pressure and economic incentives to maintain high levels 
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of production. Length of membership in the EU also has statistically significant, positive effect, 
providing evidence that countries that have been in the EU longer have higher per-capita rates of 
verified emissions than newer member states. However, the effect of length of membership is 
also contingent upon the effects of corruption. In this model the interaction term, 
Length*Corruption, is also significant. Figure 4.6 illustrates predicted values of verified 
emissions per capita for a range of values of length of membership controlling for other factors. 
Public Opinion, Green in Government, Cabinet Ideology, Green in EP, and GDP all fail to 
achieve significance in Model 2. 
 
Figure 4.6: Model 2 Predicted Values of Verified Emissions Per Capita for Length of 
Membership 
 
Model 3 examines influences on member states meeting their emissions reductions 
targets established in annual National Allocation Plans (see Table 4.5) using logit analysis. 
Corruption, Renewable Energy, Oil Production, Length of Membership, and Length*Corruption 





Table 4.5: Meeting EU ETS Targets 
N = 154 
Prob  Chi2= 0.0246 
Pseudo R² = 0.1791 
*p>.10, **p>.05, ***p>.001 (two-tailed test) 
Bracketed positive and negative signs after the odds ratio indicate the direction of the effect from 
the z score. 
 
In this model, corruption has statistically significant negative effects, consistent direction 
predicted by H2. States that are more corrupt are less likely to meet their emissions targets, while 
countries that are least corrupt are more likely to meet them. Figure 4.7 illustrates the predicted 
probability of meeting emissions reductions targets at various levels of corruption. Countries that 
are the most corrupt with corruption scores of three have a 28% chance of meeting their targets, 
while least corrupt countries with scores of nine have a 57% chance of meeting their targets. The 
amount of energy produced from renewable energy has a significant effect, but one that is 
opposite of the prediction of H6. In this model, countries producing more renewable energy are 
less likely to meet their EU emissions targets. It is interesting to note that renewable energy 
production had an opposite effect on the reduction of verified emissions in models 1 and 2. 
Figure 4.8 illustrates the predicted probability of a state meeting their emissions targets at 
various levels of renewable energy production, holding all other variables at their means. 
Countries producing no electricity from renewable sources are predicted to have a 42.7% chance 
 Odds Ratio SE 
Corruption [-]      0.3624515**  [-] 0.1507959  
Public Opinion[-]            0.99929          [-]  0.0318465 
Renewable Energy[-]            1.650707**    [+]                        0.3029717 
Oil Production [+]            8.33 e-30*      [-]                        2.88 e-28 
Green in Government [-]            0.8845859      [-]  0.4690984   
Cabinet Ideology [+]            1.156223        [+]   0.1962571 
Length of Membership             0.8014083**  [-]   0.0602298 
Green Party in EP [-]            0.9288379      [-]                        0.091076 
GDP            0.9999861      [-]   0.0000225 
Post-Communist             0.8085632      [-] 0.5029175 
Length*Corruption            1.035075**    [+] 0.0120144 
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of meeting their targets while countries producing 9 billion kilowatt hours per capita of 
electricity from renewable sources had only a 2.4% chance of meeting targets. 
 
Figure 4.7: Predicted Probabilities of Meeting Targets for Corruption 
 
Figure 4.8: Predicted Probabilities of Meeting Targets for Renewable Energy 
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Higher levels of oil production are surprisingly statistically significantly related to 
meeting targets. Length of membership in the EU, as well as the interaction term, 
Length*Corruption, also reach statistical significance. However, the substantive effect of length 
of membership on the likelihood of meeting emissions targets is small (see Figure 4.9). Public 
Opinion, Green in Government, Cabinet Ideology, and Green in EP all have effects in their 
respective predicted directions, but do not reach statistical significance. Post-Communist and 
GDP also fail to reach significance.  
 
Figure 4.9: Predicted Probabilities of Meeting Targets for Length of Membership 
Model 4 is a logit analysis examining member states meeting emissions targets when 
controlling for past compliance to other EU environmental directives (see Table 4.6). Note that 
this Model, like Model 2, also only includes the EU 15. In this model, only Renewable Energy 
and Green Party in EP have statistically significant effects. Increasing renewable energy 
production is negatively associated with meeting EU emissions targets, similar to the effects seen 
in Model 3. This is inconsistent with the hypothesized effects of this variable and therefore does 
not provide any evidence for H6.  
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Table 4.6: Past Infringement and Meeting EU ETS Targets 
N = 90 
Prob Chi2=  0.0425 
Pseudo R² = 0.2764 
*p>.10, **p>.05, ***p>.001 (two-tailed test) 
Bracketed positive and negative signs after the odds ratio indicate the direction of the effect from 
the z score. 
 
Past Infringement, Corruption, and Green in Government all had effects in the predicted 
direction, but failed to reach levels of statistical significance. Public Opinion, Oil Production, 
Cabinet Ideology, Length of Membership, GDP, and Length*Corruption all failed to have 
statistically significant effects in Model 4. Figure 4.10 illustrates the predicted probabilities of 
meeting targets at various levels of per-capita renewable energy production. Green party 
representation in the European Parliament is associated with meeting targets, providing evidence 
for H12 (see Figure 4.11). Countries with no green party representation in the EP have a 22% 
chance of meeting targets while countries with 14 green party members in the EP are predicted to 
have an 84% chance of meeting targets. 
 
 Odds Ratio SE 
Infringement [+]            1.004304         [+] 0.0133397 
Corruption [-]           0.6226579       [-] 0.5034612 
Public Opinion[-]           1.076834         [+] 0.0558089 
Renewable Energy[-]           3.437218**     [+]                      1.683057 
Oil Production [+]           1.63 e-28         [-]                      6.59 e-27 
Green in Government[-]           0.50789           [-]                      0.3648773 
Cabinet Ideology [+]           0.838841         [-]                      0.2406372 
Length of Membership           0.9355654       [-]                      0.1338705 
Green Party in EP [-]           0.7807188**   [-]                      0.976584 
GDP           0.9999617       [-]                      0.0000283 




Figure 4.10: Predicted Probabilities of Meeting Targets for Renewable Energy 
 
Figure 4.11: Predicted Probabilities of Meeting Targets for Green Party Seats 
Discussion  
Since the EU ETS has been relatively recently created and given that a portion of the time 
period examined includes the trial phase, it will be important to continue to evaluate this program 
to see if the patterns discovered in this analysis continue into the future, or if they change once it 
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becomes better established. The factors influencing the reduction of emissions per-capita and 
those influencing meeting EU targets seem to be somewhat unexpectedly different (see Table 
4.7).  
Table 4.7: Comparative Model Results: Directional Effects and Significance Levels 



















Past Infringement [+]   -***  + 
Corruption [-]       +*** +**           -** - 
Public Opinion [-] -           +           - + 
Renewable Energy [-]       -***   -***           +**     +** 
Oil Production [+] - -**           -* - 
Green in Gov [-] -            +           - - 
Cabinet Ideology [+]    +*            -           + - 
Length of Membership         +***   +**           -** - 
Green in EP [-]  +            +           -     -** 
GDP      +**            +           - - 
Post-Communist      +**            -  
Length*Corruption        -***    -***           +** + 
 
A change in verified emissions over time indicates the actual results of efforts to reduce 
the total levels of emissions across all EU ETS facilities in a country. This number in some ways 
is a more direct measure of success than simply meeting emissions targets. Targets are proposed 
by countries in their National Allocation Plans, then approved or disapproved by the 
Commission. This allows for political influence in the process of setting the targets themselves. 
Countries with fewer resources, poorer institutional capacity, or those that are just poorer, can be 
given more leeway than richer states with highly developed environmental institutions; 
especially since the burden of meeting Kyoto standards is spread across the entire EU, rather 





 Corruption. Two hypotheses relating to corruption were proposed. H1 states that as 
political corruption increases, verified emissions will increase. Models 1 and 2 offer no evidence 
that this is the case, but instead the effect of corruption was statistically significant in the 
opposite direction. In both models, the independent effect of corruption on verified emissions is 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that as levels of corruption increase, verified 
emissions decrease.  However, the effect of corruption is also dependent upon length of 
membership. In both models, Length of Membership and the interaction term, 
Length*Corruption, also had statistically significant effects. H2 relates to Model 3 and Model 4 
and states that as levels of political corruption increase, member states will be less likely to meet 
their emissions targets. The results of Model 3 provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In 
Model 3, as corruption levels increase, likelihood of meeting emissions targets decrease. This 
model includes all 27 member states, while Model 4 includes only the EU 15; therefore, it is 
interesting to note that this effect occurs when examining the EU as a whole, but disappears 
when only examining the EU 15 and controlling for past environmental infringement actions. 
However, the effect of corruption is again related to Length of Membership in this model. 
Additional research may better disentangle the significant relationship between these two 
variables, especially given that it is not driven by the effects of post-communism which is 
accounted for in Model 1 and Model 3 and irrelevant in Model 2 and Model 4.  
 Public Opinion. Public opinion did not have a statistically significant effect in any of the 
models; therefore, H3 and H4 are not confirmed.  
 Renewable Energy and Oil Production. Hypothesis H5 indicates the anticipated effect 
of renewable energy production on verified emissions, stating that as the amount of energy 
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produced from renewable sources increase, verified emissions will decrease. Renewable Energy 
is statistically significant in both Model 1 and Model 2, providing strong evidence that as 
renewable energy production goes up, emissions levels will go down.  This seems intuitive, 
given that the amount of energy produced by renewables would generate fewer carbon emissions 
than had the same amount of electricity been generated using another fuel source like coal.  
Renewable Energy also had a statistically significant effect in Models 3 and 4, but in the 
opposite direction as predicted in H6. These models found that as renewable energy production 
increases, member states are less likely to meet their emissions targets.  
 High levels of oil production were hypothesized to have negative impacts on the 
reduction of verified emissions, as well as the meeting of targets (H7 and H8). However, the 
results of the models do not provide evidence of this. Oil production did have statistically 
significant effects in Model 2 and Model 3, but opposite of the direction predicted. In Model 2, 
including the EU 15, increasing oil production was associated with decreasing verified 
emissions. In Model 3, including all 27 member states, increasing oil production was associated 
with an increased likelihood of meeting emissions targets. This is a surprising finding, however, 
given that the countries producing the largest amounts of oil, Denmark, the United Kingdom, 
produce drastically more than other EU countries. In future research, it would be interesting and 
helpful to sort out patterns for the largest oil producers - Denmark and the UK - from countries 
producing oil but in smaller amounts, and those countries that produce no oil domestically. In 
addition, countries like the UK and Denmark are very unlikely to stop, or even reduce, oil 
production as they move toward other fuel sources for domestic electricity generation. The 
emissions generated by the use of the oil produced will simply shift to the countries with higher 
demand for oil willing to purchase it.  
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 Green Parties. Hypotheses H9 and H10 suggest that if a green party is a member of the 
government, verified emissions will decrease and the likelihood of meeting targets will increase. 
No evidence was found across any of the models supporting either of these hypotheses. The 
variable Green in Government did not reach statistical significance in any of the models. H11 
states that as the number of a country’s seats held by a green party in the European Parliament 
increases, verified emissions will decrease. No evidence to support this hypothesis was found in 
Model 1 or Model 2. H12 states that as the number of a country’s seats held by a green party in 
the European Parliament increases, member states are more likely to meet their emissions 
targets. Model 3 does not provide evidence supporting this, but in Model 4 as green party 
representation in the EP increased, the likelihood of meeting targets also increased. Therefore, 
there is support for H12, but only for the EU 15. 
 Cabinet Ideology. Hypothesis H13 stated that as government ideology becomes more 
left-leaning, verified emissions will decrease. In Model 1, left-leaning governments were 
associated with reduction of verified emissions indicating that, for the EU 27, this is the case. 
However, in Model 2, which only includes the EU 15 and accounts for past infringement, the 
effect of cabinet ideology was not significant. The variable, Cabinet Ideology, did not have 
statistically significant effects in Model 3 or in Model 4, therefore H14 is not supported, and 
does not seem to influence likelihood of meeting emissions targets.   
 Past Infringement. The variable Past Infringement was only included in Model 2 and 
Model 4 and was only available for the EU 15. Past Infringement was statistically significant in 
Model 2, but in the opposite direction predicted by H15. Past Infringement was not significant in 
Model 4; therefore H16, countries with higher past infringement will be less likely to meet 




Renewable energy production was the only variable with statistically significant effects 
in all four models. Not surprisingly, countries producing more renewable energy per person were 
also likely to have lower levels of verified carbon emissions. This is likely due to the direct 
reduction in carbon emissions due to a replacement of fossil fuels by renewable energy sources.  
This finding could also indicate that a country was committing to reducing their national GHG 
emissions through changes in energy policy as well as through the ETS. The effects found for 
Renewable Energy on the likelihood of meeting targets are surprising. Opposite effects are 
observed when considering countries’ abilities to meet emissions targets. Countries producing 
less electricity from renewable sources are more likely to meet targets.  
The relationship between Length of Membership and Corruption is significant, but why is 
still unclear. The length of time a state had been a member of the European Union had a 
significant, positive effect in Models 1 and 2 (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). The longer countries were 
members of the EU, the better they were at reducing their per-capita emissions levels. Length of 
membership had the opposite effect on meeting emissions reduction targets, potentially 
indicating that targets for older members may have been more stringent and difficult to meet than 
those for newer member states. In addition, countries that have more recently joined the EU had 
an incentive prior to joining the EU to demonstrate the willingness and capability to move 
toward compliance; new member states may therefore be relatively likely to be in compliance. 
Corruption also had a significant positive effect in Model 1 and Model 2, but an effect in the 
opposite direction for meeting targets. The interaction term, Length*Membership, is also 
significant across Models 1, 2, and 3. These effects are not driven my any factors related to post 
communism or GDP, since they are accounted for in the model.  
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Chapter 5: Case Selection and Methods 
Methods 
 In order to further examine the influences on member states ability to reduce their carbon 
emissions under the EU ETS four qualitative case studies of individual member states are 
examined in the following chapters. The cases will allow additional examination of the variables 
included in the statistical analysis, but within the context of other factors specific to each 
individual country included. This chapter describes the methods that will used to conduct the 
case studies as well as the reasoning for selecting the cases examined in the following chapters.  
Structured Focused Comparison. The cases examined in this study employ the logic of 
structured, focused comparison. “Structured, focused comparison is a simple method of 
approaching case studies. It is an approach that “is “structured” in that the researcher writes 
general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each 
case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison 
and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible.” (George and Bennett 2005, 67) 
The selected cases will include examination of the same variables from the statistical 
analysis found in chapter 4; corruption, public opinion on climate change, renewable energy 
production, oil production, green party representation in government, cabinet ideology, length of 
European Union membership, green party representation in the European Parliament, GDP, and 
past infringement actions taken against the state. Comparison of the cases across several other 
areas is also conducted to further examine other potential influences on state’s abilities to reduce 
their carbon emissions that would have been difficult to include in the statistical models in the 
form of questions that will form the basis of my structured focused comparison.  
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The questions examined will help to provide additional information not captured by the 
operationalization of the variables included in the statistical analysis, or left out of the analysis 
due to difficulty of operationalization or data availability. The questions cover information about 
the structure of government, energy politics and policy, vulnerability to climate change and any 
additional policies in place at national level to combat climate change.  
The questions I will examine for each case include: 
1) What is quality of life like in the country? 
2) How corrupt is the government? 
3) How long has the country been a member of the EU and is it a member of the Eurozone? 
4) What party or parties control government and what are their ideological positions? 
5) Is there green party representation in the government or legislature? 
6) Is there green party representation in the European Parliament? 
7) Has the country traditionally been a leader or laggard in environmental policy? 
8) When was the country’s first environmental ministry or institution established? 
9)  What is the country’s record of compliance with existing EU environmental policy? 
10) What sources of energy does the country currently rely on for its total generation of 
electricity? 
11) Is the country a major producer of oil or renewable energy? 
12) What is the potential for additional use of solar or wind energy in the country?  
13) Is the member state vulnerable to the projected effects of climate change in the form of 
temperature changes, flooding, drought, or other changes? 
14) What measures or policies does the member state have in place to adapt to potential 
effects of climate change? 
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15) What are overall levels of GHG production like in the country? 
Case Selection 
Prior to selecting which member states to examine in greater detail though case study 
analysis, a comparison was made of all potential cases, the 27 member states of the European 
Union, across the data used in the statistical analysis. 
Leaders and Laggards. The dependent variables in my statistical models, verified 
emissions and meeting emissions targets, are both measures indicating a member state’s overall 
progress towards reducing emissions regulated under the Emissions Trading System but provide 
slightly different information; because of this, it seems especially relevant to compare the 
performance of all member states across these measures. Figure 5.1 shows the ranking of all 
member states from best to worst in their average emissions reductions. The first column ranks 
member states based on their total verified emissions per capita from ETS regulated facilities 
from 2005-2010. The second column ranks member states based on the difference between their 
allocated and verified emissions from ETS facilities. Slovenia, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Spain, 
Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom were the only member states who did not meet their 
emissions reduction goals, while all other member states were able to exceed their targets, 
reducing their emissions even further than the goals established in their respective national 
allocation plans.  
 In the literature on comparative environmental policy in Europe some countries have 
been considered policy “leaders” and some have been considered policy “laggards.” Denmark, 
Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands all have records as leaders in 
environmental policy while Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Belgium all have 
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reputations as environmental laggards (Anderson and Liefferink, 1998, Barnes and Barnes, 
1999). 
Verified Emissions   Emissions Targets  
 
1.    Latvia    1.    France 
2.    Lithuania    2.    Poland  
3.    France    3.    Romania 
4.    Sweden    4.    Czech Republic 
5.    Hungary    5.    Slovakia 
6.    Romania     6.    Belgium 
7.    Portugal    7.    Portugal 
8.    Italy    8.    Lithuania  
9.    Spain    9.    Netherlands 
10.  Austria    10.  Sweden 
11.  United Kingdom   11.  Hungary 
12.  Slovenia    12.  Finland  
13.  Slovakia    13.  Estonia 
14.  Ireland    14.  Bulgaria 
15.  Bulgaria    15.  Latvia 
16.  Malta    16.  Austria 
17.  Netherlands   17.  Luxembourg 
18.  Belgium    18.  Malta 
19.  Luxembourg    19.  Cyprus 
20.  Denmark    20.  Slovenia 
21.  Poland    21.  Ireland 
22.  Germany    22.  Greece 
23.  Greece    23.  Denmark 
24.  Cyprus    24.  Spain 
25.  Finland    25.  Italy 
26.  Czech Republic   26.  Germany 
27.  Estonia    27.  United Kingdom 
 
Figure 5.1: Emissions Reductions in the European Union: Climate Leaders and Laggards 
 
The four final cases selected for analysis include two traditional “leader” states, Sweden 
and Denmark, and two traditional “laggard” states, Portugal and Greece. Based on their previous 
reputations, one might assume that Sweden and Denmark would be more effective at reducing 
their emissions than Portugal and Greece. However, the performance of these countries in regard 
to emissions reduction is not so simple. Sweden is doing well in reducing its overall emissions 
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from EU ETS facilities, ranking third out of all EU member states and meeting its targets, while 
Denmark has been struggling to reduce its CO₂ emissions. An examination of the emissions 
reduction performance of the traditional laggards reveals that, Portugal has been successful in 
reducing their overall verified emissions from EU ETS facilities, while Greece has had little 
success, frequently missing its targets and having the 23
rd
 worst record in overall verified 
emissions rates. The following chapters examine the factors influencing the differences in 
emissions reduction in these states.  
The cases are also divided geographically: two northern cases and two southern cases. 
This will account for potential differences in political culture as well as structural differences in 
energy needs and consumption (heating and cooling costs, more or less potential solar energy 
dependent on latitude). The cases also may provide insight into the role that corruption levels 
play since that was a poorly explained effect in the statistical model. Sweden and Portugal are 
preforming well, but vary on levels of corruption – Sweden with very low levels and Portugal 
with somewhat high; and Denmark and Greece who are both doing poorly in reducing emissions 
but also represent one country with very low levels of corruption and the other with high levels. 
The following chapters will answer the above questions for each case; Sweden, Denmark, 
Portugal, and Greece, and Chapter Ten concludes by comparing all four cases against each other 








Chapter 6: Sweden 
Introduction  
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy located in northern Europe. The monarch is the 
ceremonial head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. The parliament is 
unicameral and elected using proportional representation. The country is a unitary consensus 
democracy characterized by coalition governments, an executive-legislative balance of power, 
and a multiparty system electing its representatives using proportional representation (Lijphart 
1999). Lijphart also famously argued that consensus style democracies are “kinder, gentler” and 
“have a better record with regard to protection of the environment” (275) This seems to be the 
case in Sweden, which is considered to have a pattern of consensus democracy similar to the 
other Nordic countries that is marked by a “distinctly Scandinavian culture of consensus” and 
has institutions that enhance “conciliation and arbitration” (Elder, Thomas, and Arter 1988, 221). 
In Swedish policy making in particular, “there is a long tradition of seeking consensus between 
opposing groups and interests through negotiations. In this process mutual trust is built” (Kronsel 
in Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 57). Ostrom (1990) suggested that building trust through 
repeated interactions of stakeholders is key to managing common pool resources, particularly 
environmental resources. 
Overall, quality of life is considered very high because of relatively high per capita GDP, 
long life expectancy, good access to education and health care,
16
 and very low levels of 
corruption. GDP per capita in 2010 was €37,000
17
 and average life expectancy at birth was 80 
for men and 84 for women. Sweden provides various and extensive social welfare programs to 
its citizens including universal health care (Wright 2004). Adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS is low, 
                                                          
16
 Health and education statistics from CIA World Factbook, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html 
17
 Source: Eurostat available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
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comprising 0.1 percent of the population, and adult obesity rates are also relatively low at 12 
percent of the population.  Free public day care for children aged one through six is available and 
90 percent of students go on to attend upper secondary school after completing their compulsory 
education. Sweden’s adult literacy rate is 99 percent.
18
 Sweden also ranks highly on the United 
Nation’s Human Development Index, ranking 10
th
 in 2011 and falling under the category of 
‘very high’ human development.
19
 All of these factors combined would suggest Sweden is a 
“Postmaterialist” country. 
After elections held in September of 2010, the cabinet was composed of four parties: the 
Moderate Coalition Party (107 seats out of a total 349 in the Riksdag, left/right score of 7.8, 
leaning right), the Liberal People’s Party (24 seats, left/right score 6.2), the Centre Party (23 
seats, left/right score 5.8), and the Christian Democrats (19 seats, left/right score 7.0) leading to 
an overall right leaning cabinet (ParlGov.org). Sweden ranks fourth in the world on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index,
20
 being one of the least corrupt countries in the world, scoring a 
9.3 in 2011 on a zero to ten score of corruption. Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, the 
same year as Austria and Finland, and in 2003 rejected adopting the Euro in a national 
referendum.  
Environmental Institutions and Past Environmental Record 
Sweden has been a leader in establishing environmental policies and institutions, views 
itself as a proactive role model for other countries, and has tried to influence and improve overall 
levels of environmental protection at the level of the European Union. Sweden was a “pioneer” 
in regard to establishing its own domestic environmental policy. “Modern environmental policy 
                                                          
18
 See State Department Background Note: Sweden for more information. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2880.htm  
19
 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ for more information.  
20
 See http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/  
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in Sweden dated back to the 1964 Nature Conservation Act and the 1969 Environment Protection 
Act. Although these two pieces of legislation are still relevant today, the scope and direction of 
environmental policy have undergone some major changes since those early years” (Molin 1999, 
244). Like early environmental policy in the United States, Swedish policy in the 1960s and 
1970s was “rather typical of the early stages of environmental legislation in that it was mainly set 
up to combat point source emissions” (Kronsel in Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 49). However, 
environmental policy and institutions evolved over time to approach environmental protection 
from a “more holistic manner” reflecting the tenants of sustainable development included in the 
1987 Brundtland Report (Molin 1999). In 1976, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
was established and in 1987 a separate Environment and Energy Ministry was formed. It is 
important to note that Sweden’s primary environmental ministry was established before it 
became a member of the European Union, unlike Greece and Portugal which did not have 
national environmental ministries before their entry into the EU.  
Sweden is also considered to be a ‘leader’ in environmental policy within the European 
Union (Molin 1999; Anderson and Liefferink 1997) and prior to their entry into the European 
Union in 1995; concerns over environmental standards played a large role in the debate over 
membership. “There was a widespread fear in the ‘no’ camp that Sweden would be forced to 
lower its environmental standards when joining the Community, and would not be able to 
continue pursuing an international environmental leadership role as an EU member” (Molin 
1999, 244). Once a member of the EU, Sweden worked to improve overall environmental quality 
standards and had particular success in several areas in the 1990s, including acidification, the 
Intergovernmental Conference, and the Auto/Oil Programme (Molin 1999). “Instead of taking a 
strong defensive stance on issues of national importance, Sweden has chosen to try to persuade 
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fellow Member States of the necessity for strict EU environmental standards by combining role-
model tactics with active lobbying within the Community” (Molin 1999, 251). Trying to 
establish an environmental consensus in line with their political culture of shared decision-
making while serving as an example of the way forward Sweden has been able to maintain 
relatively high levels of environmental protection domestically while trying to establish more 
stringent measures throughout the EU that will, in turn improve their domestic pollution issues 
further, particularly in regard to acid rain. “Swedish policy-makers believed that if Sweden could 
not set an example, it would have no grounds on which to argue that other countries should work 
towards reducing the sulphur content of fossil fuels” (Kronsel in Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 
44). Given these preferences for being a positive leader in environmental policy it is not 
surprising that Sweden also has one of the best records of compliance to existing EU 
environmental regulations. Between 1995 and 2004 only 55 actions were taken against Sweden 
for non-compliance with EU environmental regulations, the second best record among the EU 15 
(Camyar 2007).  
A partial explanation for Sweden’s preference for stringent environmental policy stems 
from their decades of struggle with transboundary air pollution from other European countries 
contributing to acid rainfall on Swedish soil. Acid rain is caused primarily by emissions of sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides. “Swedish scientists found that between 1962 and 1996 the wind-
borne pollutants had increased the acidity of rainfall by a factor of eight. Swedish soil is low in 
calcium and as a result the Swedish ecosystem was particularly sensitive to acidification, with 
much damage being done to forests, lakes and rivers” (Barnes and Barnes 1999, 26). The 
Swedish government took action to reduce domestic sources of pollution “by banning the 
burning of high-sulphur oils in 1969” (26). However, domestic sources were not the only or even 
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the primary contributor to Sweden’s acid rain problem and “evidence accumulated that wind-
borne sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide could be carried over long distances. As a consequence 
of the prevailing wind direction, the source of much of the pollution affecting Sweden came 
primarily from the UK, Germany and Poland”(27).Since most of the pollution was being emitted 
in other European countries, Sweden had incentives early on to encourage international and 
transnational cooperation to reduce pollutants. Currently, Sweden continues to face 
environmental problems including the continued effects of acid rain, pollution in the Baltic and 
North Seas
21
 and a desire to continue to reduce greenhouse gases and adapt to the potential 
effects of climate change.  
The Green Party in Sweden has been relatively successful and by the 1982 and 1985 
elections had gained seats on many municipal councils (Bennulf and Johnsson 1993, 30), and in 
1988 the Green Party members were elected to the national parliament. (Kronsel in Anderson 
and Liefferink 1997, 51). In the October 2010 election
22
 the Green Party won 25 out of 349 total 
seats in the legislature or 7.3 percent of the vote share. This was up from the previous vote share 
in the 2006 election where the Greens won 19 seats. In the June 2009 European Parliament 
elections the Green Party won 11percent of the vote share capturing 2 out of 18 seats. Though 
the Green Party is relatively well represented in Sweden it was never a member of the ruling 
coalition between 2005 and 2010.  
Energy  
Current Energy Use. Sweden is a leader in the production of renewable resources in 
Europe and is second only to Germany in the production of electricity from renewable energy 
producing an average of 76.745 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) per capita annually from 2005-
                                                          
21
 CIA World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html  
22
 Elections results from http://www.parlgov.org  
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2010. Renewable energy in Sweden is generated from primarily from biomass (11387 Thousand 
toe
23
) and hydropower (5709 Thousand toe) but also from wind (301 Thousand toe) and solar (11 
Thousand Toe).
24
 Sweden also relies less on fossil fuels in its total energy consumption and 
electricity generation than the EU average and produces relatively low amounts of oil (3.899 
thousand barrels per day per capita average annually from 2005-2010
25
). The Swedish are less 
dependent on fossil fuels than some Member States because of their reaction to the Oil Crisis and 
due to progressive climate and energy policies. “The oil embargo created an oil crisis in Sweden, 
and the most important concerns became the dependence on fossil fuel and Sweden’s subsequent 
vulnerability to external politics” (Kronsel in Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 44). In response, 
Sweden introduced energy conservation policies and “various types of research projects and 
initiatives aimed at developing alternative energy sources were initiated. Energy conservation 
methods and insulation techniques were encouraged by governmental funds and subsidies. In 
addition, petrol was rationed; television transmission was stopped at 10 p.m.” (Kronsel in 
Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 45). Sweden also introduced a tax on energy use for steel 
producers encouraging the industry to become more energy efficient. (Anderson and Liefferink 
1997, 33). As of 2009, 58 percent of electricity in Sweden is generated from renewable sources, 
while only 2 percent is generated from oil and coal. Though there was a ban on nuclear energy in 
Sweden in 1979, that ban was later lifted, partially to reduce carbon emissions. In 2009 38 
percent of electricity generated was from nuclear power.  
Potential for Renewable Energy. Sweden has one of the highest potentials for Wind 
energy development in Europe. According to the EEA, Sweden’s potential for offshore wind 
                                                          
23
 Ton of oil equivalent  
24
 Data is for 2010 and available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/guip/mapAction.do?indicator=ten00082_2&mapMode=dynamic&mapTab=1 
25
 Data available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/  
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production is relatively average at about 1,000 terawatt hours (TWh). However, Sweden has the 
second highest unrestricted technical potential for onshore wind energy in Europe after France 
with over 5,000 TWh of technical potential. Development potential for solar, or photovoltaic, 
energy is somewhat lower.
26
 Northern Europe receives much less annual sunshine than southern 
Europe. However, though there is less potential than in the south, Sweden is already generating 
some solar energy and could expand production.  
Vulnerability to Climate Change 
 Currently, southern Sweden has a generally temperate climate and the south and a 
subarctic climate in the north. The terrain is mostly flat to hilly with mountains in the western 
portion of the country.
27
 Sweden already experiences some annual coastal and inland flooding, 
and without any plans for implementing adaptation strategies, it is expected to increase into the 
future.
28
 Though there is potential for increased flooding, it is not as severe as in other parts of 
Europe like the United Kingdom, southern Greece, Latvia, parts of northern Germany, and the 
island of Sicily in Italy. Increases in temperature can also contribute to potential increases in 
human health hazards. Sweden may experience some increases in heat-related mortality, though 
projected increases would me much lower than in other parts of Europe, particularly Portugal. 
Sweden could also experience an increase in certain disease vectors as warmer temperatures 
expand potential ranges of species like Aedes albopoctus, a species of mosquito that can be a 
carrier of several viruses including Chikungunya. Though Aedes albopoctus is not currently 
present in Sweden, projections show that by 2030, temperature changes could lead to areas 
                                                          
26
 See http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvgis/cmaps/eur.htm for maps of solar radiation and photovoltaic energy potential in 
Europe. 
27
 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html  
28
 See http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/coastal-areas/coastal-areas-assessment-published-sep-
2008 for a map of projected flooding.  
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around the southern coast of the country becoming more suitable habitat for the mosquito (EEA 
2008a).  
According to the European Environment Agency, Sweden has already begun to 
experience temperature changes due to anthropogenic climate change. Annual mean changes 
range between 0.6 and 1.2 °C per decade
29
 between 1976 and 2006. This observed warming was 
most pronounced in the winters with average temperatures increasing 0.6-2 °C per decade during 
the same time period. This is the most pronounced warming of any region in Europe. This 
warming trend is expected to increase into the future. IPCC models suggest that Sweden is likely 
to experience a change in mean temperature between 1980-1999 and 2080-2099 of an increase of 
3-5 °C. This is the highest projected temperature increase in Europe. Sweden’s neighbors, 
Norway and Finland, are the only other countries that will experience a similarly high projected 
temperature increase. Sweden has also experienced changes in annual precipitation. Between 
1961 and 2006 precipitation increased up to 30 millimeters per decade in some areas of the 
country.  This trend is expected to continue into the future with projected increases in average 
annual precipitation of 5-20 percent in 2080-2099 as compared to precipitation levels 
experienced in 1980-1999.  
Climate Change Politics and Policy  
Sweden has also been a leader in climate change policy. In 1991 Sweden introduced a 
carbon-energy tax similar to the one later proposed by the European Commission (Anderson and 
Liefferink 1997). Sweden has already adopted a national adaptation plan to mitigate the potential 
impact of climate change
30
 and between 2009 and 2011 the Swedish government spent 5 billion 
Krona, or about €5.6 billion, on adaptation policies and planning to reduce the potential impact 
                                                          
29
 See map 5.1 of “Impacts of Europe’s changing climate – 2008 indicator based assessment” available at:  
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eea_report_2008_4 
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 Among some of the national adaptation programs and policies that have 
already been implemented are GreenClimateAdapt, AQUARIUS, and Climate Strait. 
GreenClimateAdapt is a program designed to help cities adapt to heat waves and increasing 
precipitation by adopting green roofs and facades, open storm water management, and other 
tools.
32
  AQUARIUS is an EU funded program that Sweden participates in with Germany, 
Scotland, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands to share information and tools on soil and 
water conservation between farmers, foresters and landowners in those countries.
33
 Climate 
Strait is a networking based initiative for municipalities with workshops on climate and energy 
related topics.
34
 Sweden is also a part of the Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013 which is a 
cooperative group of 11 countries around the Baltic Sea designed to improve maritime safety and 
security, economic development, energy transmission and supply, transportation and the 
environment in the region. One of the identified priority areas addressed by the program is 
climate change, particularly adaptation.
35
 
Public Opinion on Climate Change. In a special Eurobarometer survey conducted in 
August and September of 2009 several questions were asked about attitudes towards climate 
change. Overall, the Swedish view climate change as a very serious problem, do not think 
enough is being done to combat it, and do not see increased environmental regulations as an 
obstacle to economic growth. Swedes are the most likely members of the European Union to 
view climate change as one of the “most serious problems facing the world as a whole” with 75 
percent of respondents selecting climate change as a response. This is significantly higher than 
                                                          
31
 See http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5745  
32
 See http://www.malmo.se/ for more information on GreenClimateAdapt  
33
 See http://www.smhi.se/klimatanpassningsportalen for more information and links on the AQUARIUS project. 
34
 See http://www.klimasundet.net/svensk.html for more information on Climate Strait  
35
 See http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/web/guest/transnational-regions/baltic-sea and http://eu.baltic.net/ for more 
information on the Baltic Sea Region Programme  
70 
 
the responses to the same question from the EU as a whole, only 47 percent of all respondents 
selected climate change. When asked about the severity of the issue, sixty-eight percent of 
Swedish respondents replied that climate change is a “very serious problem”. Sixty-eight percent 
of respondents felt the EU was “not doing enough to combat climate change” while 24 percent 
felt that the EU was “doing the right amount”. Fifty-nine percent of respondents felt that the 
Swedish government was not doing enough while 34 percent felt the government was doing the 
right amount. Seventy percent of Swedes think that corporations and industry are “not doing 
enough to fight climate change” while only 24 percent felt they were “doing the right amount”. 
The Swedish also see climate change both as an issue that can be solved, and that investing in 
environmental protection is good for the economy and would not hinder growth. Seventy-five 
percent of respondents agreed that environmental protection could boost economic growth and 
14 percent disagreed (Eurobarometer 322 2009).  
Emissions Reduction Performance under the EU ETS. Sweden has been one of the 
best performing states in the EU in regard to reducing their CO₂ emissions. Between 2005 and 
2010, Sweden had the fourth lowest verified emissions per capita in the EU and ranked 10
th
 in 
reducing their emissions relative to their EU ETS targets (see Figure 5.1). Sweden has also met 
its EU ETS targets every year from the beginning of the ETS through 2010 (see Figure 6.1). 
Though Sweden has been meeting its targets, the total quantity of carbon emissions is still rising 
overall. In 2005, Sweden’s EU ETS facilities emitted 19,381,682 tonnes of CO₂. In 2010 Sweden 
produced 22,661,193 tonnes of CO₂. 
Though Sweden has seen an increase in emissions from those facilities, the total amount 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) produced has fallen (see Figure 6.2). In 2005 the total amount of 
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GHGs produced in Sweden was 67,591 thousand tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. By 2009 the amount 
of GHGs produced had fallen to 59,994 thousand tonnes of CO₂ equivalent.  
 
Figure 6.1: EU ETS Emissions Reduction Performance in Sweden 
 
Figure 6.2: Total GHG Emissions in Sweden, 2005-2009 
Sweden has also been successful at reducing the amount of CO₂ produced per person in the 
country (see Figure 6.3). Levels of CO₂ produced per person in the country have declined from 





























































than the average across all 27 EU member states (which was 8.6 in 2005 and 7.5 in 2009). 
Sweden has been relatively successful at meeting its targets under the EU ETS, as well as 
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions overall. 
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Chapter 7: Denmark 
Introduction  
Denmark, like Sweden, is a constitutional monarchy located in northern Europe. The 
Queen is the ceremonial head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. The 
Folketing, or parliament, is unicameral and elected using proportional representation. Denmark is 
unitary, decentralized, consensus style democracy with a similar Nordic tradition of “conciliation 
and arbitration” as Sweden (Lijphart 1999, 250). Quality of life in Denmark is very high due to 
relative wealth, health, and quality of government. GDP per capita in 2010 was € 42,200 and 
average life expectancy at birth was 77 for males and 81 for females (Eurostat). The adult 
prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS is very low at 0.2 percent of the population, and the adult obesity 
rate is also low at 11.4 percent of the population. Denmark provides taxpayer-funded universal 
healthcare to all of its citizens and taxpayer-funded education is provided including university 
education. The adult literacy rate is 99 percent. Denmark is one of the least corrupt countries in 
the world, ranking second in 2011, on the Corruption Perception Index with a score of 9.4. 
Denmark also ranks highly on the Human Development Index and in 2011 it ranked 16
th
, falling 
under the category of ‘very high’ human development. Due to the combination of these 
conditions, Denmark can be viewed as having “postmaterialist values” (Inglehart 1997). 
Denmark joined the European Union in 1973, the same year as the United Kingdom and 
Ireland. In 2000, Danes voted “no” in a national referendum to joining the European Union’s 
common currency, the Euro, and to maintain the use of the krone. After elections held in 
November of 2007, the governing coalition was formed by two political parties: the Liberal Party 
of Denmark, which received 46 out of a total 179 seats in the Folkting, and the Conservatives 




Environmental Institutions and Past Environmental Record 
Denmark has a reputation as acting as an environmental policy leader, and is considered 
part of the “green troika” (which also included Germany and the Netherlands) that acted to push 
for stringent environmental regulation in the EU (Molin 1999). Similar to the pattern of 
development of environmental institutions in the United States, some of the earliest 
environmental legislation in Denmark was related to water pollution and sanitation. In 1926 the 
Water Supply Act was passed and in 1949 the Water Course Act was passed, “regulating 
discharges to all fresh waters” (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 252). In the 1960s concern over 
pollution began to increase, leading to the creation of new environmental institutions in the 
1970s—a pattern similar to the experiences in the United States and Sweden. In 1971 a new 
Ministry of Pollution Control was established and in the following year the Hazardous Waste Act 
was passes. In 1973 the Environmental Protection Act was adopted and established the Ministry 
of Environment.  By the 1980s, however, there were concerns about enforcement and 
compliance to the new environmental regulations. This led to another round of intense debate on 
the environment that would lead to the establishment of additional policy. In 1987 the Plan for 
the Aquatic Environment was introduced and in 1992 the Plan for Sustainable Agriculture was 
established, but this time also contained “binding guidelines for waste water treatment as well as 
new restrictions on agricultural practices” (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 255). 
By the early 1990s Denmark was considered by some to be the most environmentally 
progressive of all the EU member states, but that position started to change later in the 1990s. 
“Denmark’s reluctant attitude towards European integration has tended to make its European 
environmental policies defensive; Denmark has tended to focus more on opt-outs and guarantees 
than the attainment of high standards of a common European environmental policy, but at the 
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same time, wished to maintain its right to be ‘cleaner than the rest’” (Anderson and Liefferink 
1997, 252). The 1990s also saw a broadening of the types of instruments applied to 
environmental policy including some that were voluntary and others that were based on 
economic incentives (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 257). Denmark initiated policies to reduce 
their CO₂ emissions in the 1990s with the introduction of the Ministry of Energy’s Energy 2000 
plan. That plan which included taxes on carbon emissions, improved efficiency standards for 
appliances, and the increased use of wind energy and natural gas (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 
257). 
As of the 2007 parliamentary elections and the 2009 European Parliament elections, the 
Green Party, De Grønne, was not represented in either the national legislature or the EP. 
However, the Socialist People’s Party, Socialistisk Folkeparti, is an observer party to the 
European Greens and their two members elected to the European Parliament sit with the 
Greens.
36
 Overall, Denmark does have an exceptional record of compliance to existing EU 
environmental regulations. Between 1995 and 2004 only 47 formal infringement actions were 
taken against Denmark for non-compliance, the fewest of any of the EU 15 member states 
(Camyar 2007). 
The Belts and Kattegat sea waters surrounding Denmark do have some problems with 
pollution from both domestic and transboundary sources.
37
 Denmark, unlike Sweden is not 
greatly affected by acid rain and due to its geology. Layers of lime present in the soil reduce the 
potential effects of acidification (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 251). Currently, Denmark still 
has problems with “air pollution, principally from vehicle and power plant emissions; nitrogen 
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and phosphorus pollution of the Northern Sea; drinking and surface water becoming polluted 
from animal wastes and pesticides” (CIA World Factbook 2012). 
Energy 
Current Energy Use. Similarly to Sweden, Denmark was also affected by the oil 
embargo in the early 1970s and chose to improve the efficiency of their energy use. Denmark 
was completely dependent on imported oil and coal at the time of the energy crisis, and the 
government, after some discussion than rejection of the introduction of nuclear power, decided to 
implement new policies to improve energy efficiency and develop renewable resources. 
Denmark does however remain predominantly dependent on fossil fuels including coal and oil 
from the North Sea (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 254). Denmark is the second largest 
producer of oil in Europe producing an average of 305.994 thousand barrels of oil per day 
between 2005 and 2010.
38
 In 2009, solid fuels (predominantly coal) are used to generate 48 
percent of electricity in Denmark. Renewables account for 28 percent of electricity generation, 
which is 10 percent higher than the EU-wide average of 18 percent. Most of the renewable 
energy in Denmark comes from biomass (2424 thousand toe in 2010) and wind (671 thousand 
toe in 2010). Geothermal energy, hydropower and solar energy are also used.  
Potential for Renewable Energy. Denmark has low to average unrestricted technical 
potential for onshore wind energy, but has the second highest offshore potential in Europe. 
According to the EEA (2009a), onshore potential is about 900 TWh and offshore potential is just 
under 3,000 TWh. Potential for the generation of solar energy is present, but not as high as in 
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Vulnerability to Climate Change  
Denmark has a temperate climate with mild winters and cool summers. The terrain is 
mostly low and flat with some hilly areas.
40
 Denmark already experiences annual coastal and 
inland flooding, particularly on the island of Lolland and in parts of Jutland. It is not projected to 
increase much into the future,
41
 possibly because of the existing system of dykes.
42
 Temperature 
changes are projected to increase the likelihood of Aedes albopictus expanding its range into 
Denmark as the habitat becomes more suitable for the disease vector (EEA 2008a). 
According to the European Environment Agency (2008b), Denmark has already 
experienced warming due to anthropogenic climate change. Though not as dramatic as the 
warming experienced by its northern Nordic neighbors, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, 
Denmark’s temperatures have increased between 0.6 and 1.2 °C per decade between 1976 and 
2006. Denmark also experienced precipitation increases of up to 30 millimeters per decade 
between 1961 and 2006. These patterns of warming temperatures and increasing precipitation are 
expected to continue into the future. Projections made by the IPCC indicate that temperature is 
expected to be 2.5-3 °C higher in 2080-2099 than it was in 1980-1999. Precipitation is also 
projected to increase by 5-10 percent in 2080-2099 as compared to precipitation levels recorded 
from 1980-1999.   
Climate Change Politics and Policy  
 In 2008, a Commission on Climate Change was created by the Danish government.
43
 The 
Commission is composed of ten scientists charged with the task of coming up with solutions and 
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strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as well as how to move towards using more 
renewable energy sources in place of fossil fuels. Also in 2008, Denmark adopted its National 
Adaptation Strategy
44
 which includes planning and policies across several priority areas: costal 
management, water, energy, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, urban and regional planning, health, 
preparedness, buildings and construction, and nature. Denmark also established the Information 
Centre for Climate Change Adoption which is designed to provide business, citizens, and public 
authorities information on adaptive strategies. Denmark has established targets such that by 
2050, the country’s entire energy supply will come from renewable sources.
45
 This is especially 
interesting given that Denmark is one of the largest producers of oil in Europe.  
Public Opinion on Climate Change.  In a 2009 Special Eurobarometer on climate 
change 69 percent of Danish respondents felt that climate change is one of the most serious 
problems facing the world today and 63 percent felt that climate change is a “very serious issue”. 
Fifty-two percent think that the EU is “not doing enough” to combat climate change while 40 
percent think that the EU is “doing the right amount”. Danes are divided on their attitudes toward 
the actions of their government on climate change with 48 percent feeling the government is “not 
doing enough” and 46 percent thinking the government is “doing the right amount”. Danes are 
more likely than citizens of any other EU member state to think that corporations and industry 
are “doing the right amount” to fight climate change (34 percent), but the majority still think that 
they should be doing more (61 percent). Most Danes also think that the process of climate 
change can be stopped (69 percent), while 28 percent think that it is an unstoppable process. 
Most Danes do not see environmental protection as harmful to economic growth. Seventy-five 
percent agree that environmental protection can boost growth, while 15 percent disagree. 
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Emissions Reduction and Performance under the EU ETS. Given its traditional status 
as an environmental leader state, Denmark has underperformed in reducing its emissions under 
the ETS. Denmark ranks 20
th
 out of 27 EU member states, with only seven other countries 
having higher per capita emissions than Denmark.
46
 Denmark also had a poor record in regard to 
meeting their emissions targets ranking 23
rd
 out of 27. The first year of the trial period of the 
ETS, 2005, was the only year in which Denmark met its emissions targets.
47
 In 2005 Denmark 
produced 26,475,718 tonnes of CO₂ and in 2010 25,266,343 tonnes of CO₂. While this does 
represent a decline, the trend has not been a continuous downward one (see Figure 7.1).  
 
Figure 7.1: EU ETS Emissions Reduction Performance in Denmark 
Denmark has experienced a somewhat similar pattern in its overall greenhouse gas emissions, 
with a decline in total annual emissions since 2005, but a spike in total emissions in 2006. 
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In 2005, Denmark produced 63,634 GHGs (in tonnes of CO₂ equivalent), 71,556 in 2006 and 
60,985 in 2009 (see Figure 7.2). 
 
Figure 7.2: Total GHG Emissions in Denmark, 2005-2009 
Denmark is also below average in terms of the amount of carbon emissions produced per 
person in the country (see Figure 7.3). In 2005 Denmark emitted 9.4 tonnes of CO₂ per person in 
2005 and 8.8 in 2009. This is substantially above the EU 27 average which was 8.6 tonnes per 
person in 2005 and 7.5 in 2009. Overall, Denmark seems to be beginning to reduce its carbon 
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Chapter 8: Portugal 
Introduction  
Portugal is a premier-presidential
48
 democracy (Duverger 1980; Opello 1985; Bruneau 
and Macleod 1986; Nogueira 1986; and Schugart and Carey 1992) located in southern Europe, 
sharing the Iberian Peninsula with Spain. Portugal’s democratic government is relatively new 
and was established after the fall of Marcelo Caetano’s previously existing authoritarian regime 
in 1974. The new constitution was ratified in 1976, creating a unitary and centralized democracy 
(Lijphart, 1999). The parliament is unicameral and elected using proportional representation. The 
president is the head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. According to 
Lijphart, Portugal is a consensus democracy, clustering close to Sweden and Denmark on his 
Federal-Unitary Dimension and Executive-Parties Dimension (1999, 248). Portugal ranks 
relatively high on the Human Development Index, ranking 41
st
 in 2011, but has a per capita GDP 
of € 16,200, which is low relative to Sweden and Denmark. Political corruption is relatively high 
in Portugal, which has a score of 6.1 on the Corruption Perception Index.
49
 This is significantly 
higher than levels of corruption in Sweden and Denmark (9.3 and 9.4 respectively). Average life 
expectancy is still very high and in 2010 was 77 for males and 83 for females. Portugal has an 
adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 0.6 percent and an adult obesity prevalence rate of 14.2 




Portugal became a member of the European Union in 1986, the same year as Spain. 
Portugal is also a member of the Eurozone, using the Euro as its official currency. Portugal’s EU 
membership also helped to facilitate the consolidation of their newly established democracy and 
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its institutions. This was especially true in the case of regulatory areas like environmental 
protection where Portugal had “relatively weak economic and administrative capacities to 
embark upon effective harmonization with EU standards” (Koutalakis and Font 2006, 2). In a 
national election held in September of 2009, the Socialist Party (left/right score of 4.1) won 97 
out of 230 seats in the Assembleia da Republica. The current president, elected in 2006, Anibal 
Cavaco Silva is a Social Democrat (left right score of 6.2) and former prime minister.  
Environmental Institutions and Past Environmental Record 
Portugal has been considered an environmental ‘laggard’ state and prior to its entry into 
the European Union in 1986 had not yet established a national environmental ministry (Barnes 
and Barnes 1999; Anderson and Liefferink 1997; Font and Morata 1992). In 1990 the Ministry of 
the Environment and Natural Resources was established,
51
 now called the Ministry for 
Agriculture, Sea, Environment and Spatial Planning. Contributing to its laggard status is 
Portugal’s record of violating EU environmental policy. Between 1995 and 2004, Portugal had 
185 formal infringement actions taken against them for non-compliance. Their record of non-
compliance is the fourth worst in the EU 15 with only Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom 
having more infringement actions taken against it in the same time period (Camyar 2007). Prior 
to the mid-1990’s the compliance record in Portugal to EU environmental policy was even worse 
(Koutalakis and Font 2006). The Ecology Party, or Partido Ecologista, does not have much 
influence in domestic politics. In the February 2005 national elections the Ecology Party won 2 
seats out of 230 in the legislature, but lost them in the subsequent election in September of 2009. 
The Ecology Party did not win any seats to the European Parliament between 2005 and 2010. 
Currently, Portugal’s primary environmental issues are soil erosion, coastal water pollution, and 
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air pollution from industry transportation.
52
 Portugal has had some success in reducing sulfur 




Current Energy Use. Thirty-three percent of electricity generated in Portugal in 2009 
was from fossil fuels like coal and oil. Twenty-nine percent of electricity was generated from 
gas. However, renewables provided the largest fuel source used, generating 36 percent of 
electricity. Biomass and hydropower account for most of the renewable energy produced in 
Portugal (2994 and 1388 thousand toe respectively in 2010). Wind (790 thousand toe), solar 
energy (76 thousand toe) and geothermal (190 thousand toe) sources are also utilized. Portugal is 
not a major oil producing state, producing an average of 5.383 thousand barrels of oil per day 
between 2005 and 2010 according to the US Energy Information Administration.
54
  
Potential for Renewable Energy. Portugal has relatively low to average potential for 
onshore and offshore wind energy. Combined the unrestricted potential for wind energy is just 
over 1,000 TWh (EEA 2009a). The Iberian Peninsula is one of the sunniest regions in Europe, 
particularly southern Portugal which has the some of the highest potential for photovoltaic 
energy production in Europe.
55
 The only other areas with similar potential are small portions of 
southeast Spain, and the southern portion of the island of Sicily in Italy. Portugal also has 
additional hydropower potential waiting to be harnessed. According to the OECD, only 46 
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Vulnerability to Climate Change 
Portugal has a temperate climate. The rolling plains of south tend to be warm and dry 
while the north is cooler and rainy.
57
 Portugal already experiences annual coastal and inland 
flooding, but it is not projected to increase much into the future.
58
  Droughts and pressure on 
freshwater resources are expected to increase. Water scarcity and drought is already a problem in 
several river basins in Portugal including the Sado, Vouga, Taugus, Mondego, and Algarve 
(EEA 2009). Water scarcity will only continue to increase if temperatures rise and rainfall 
decreases. Portugal is projected to experience significant increases in heat-related mortality due 
to climate change. The current baseline for heat-related deaths in Portugal is about 6 per 100,000 
people. Projections indicate that heat-related mortality could increase to a range of 19.5 to 248 
per 100,000 people by 2080 (Dessai 2003; EEA 2008a). Casimiro et al. also suggest that heat-
related mortality will increase if adaptive strategies are not taken to minimize this health risk. 
They also project that increasing temperatures could lead to higher levels of ground-level ozone, 
creating an increased environmental health risk, and that “higher temperatures may increase the 
transmission risk of zoonoses that are currently endemic to Portugal, such as leishmaniasis, 
Lyme disease, and Mediterranean spotted fever” (Casimiro, Calheiros, Santos, and Kovats, 2006, 
1950). 
According to the European Environment Agency, Portugal has already experienced some 
increases in annual temperature due to climate change; these changes are most pronounced in the 
summer and average 0.4-0.6°C per decade between 1967 and 2006. Precipitation has also been 
decreasing. Between 1961 and 2006 Portugal experienced decreases in precipitation of up to 150 
millimeters per decade in some parts of the country. These trends of increasing temperatures and 
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decreasing precipitation are expected to continue into the future. Temperatures are projected to 
increase by 2.5-3.5 percent and precipitation is expected to increase by 10-30 percent from 2080-
2099 as compared to levels recorded between 1980 and 1999.  
Climate Change Politics and Policy 
Portugal’s climate and energy policies have been closely related and part of Portugal’s 
success in reducing their carbon emissions is due to changes in their energy supply. Portugal has 
reduced its dependence on coal and oil, using more natural gas and increasing use of renewables. 
Portugal also introduced a program to improve energy efficiency and reduce demand for 
electricity.
59
 Portugal was impacted negatively by the global financial crisis that started in 2007. 
In 2008 and 2009, Portugal’s economy entered a recession and part of the government’s response 




Portugal adopted a National Adaptation Strategy in 2010 that focuses on developing 
adaptive strategies, policies, and tools across nine priority areas: territory and urban 
development, water resources, safety of people and goods, human health, energy and industry, 
tourism, agriculture, forests and fisheries, coastal areas, and biodiversity.
61
 
Public Opinion on Climate Change. In a special Eurobarometer survey conducted in 
August and September of 2009 several questions were asked about attitudes towards climate 
change. Overall, more than half of Portuguese respondents thought that climate change is a 
serious problem. However, they are the least likely members of the European Union to view 
climate change as one of the “most serious problems facing the world as a whole,” with 28 
percent of respondents selecting climate change as a response. This is significantly lower than 
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the responses to the same question from the EU as a whole, where 47 percent of all respondents 
selected climate change. The response most frequently given by Portuguese to that question was 
“poverty, lack of food and drinking water” with 75 percent of Portuguese respondents giving that 
answer. This may also indicate that Portugal may somewhat less post-materialist than Sweden 
and Denmark. Fifty-three percent of Portuguese respondents replied that climate change is a 
“very serious problem” when asked about the severity of the issue. This is lower than responses 
in Sweden (68 percent), Denmark (63 percent), and the EU 27 average (63 percent). 
 Fifty-three percent of respondents in Portugal felt the EU was “not doing enough” to 
combat climate change while 22 percent felt that the EU was “doing the right amount”. Fifty-
nine percent of respondents felt that the Portuguese government was “not doing enough” while 
20 percent felt the government was “doing the right amount”. Sixty-four percent of Portuguese 
think that corporations and industry are “not doing enough” to fight climate change while only 
15 percent felt they were “doing the right amount”. Half of Portuguese respondents think that 
climate change is not an unstoppable process, and do not think that the problem has been 
exaggerated. Fifty-eight percent think that fighting climate change can have a positive impact on 
the economy while only 12 percent disagreed (Eurobarometer 322 2009).  
Emissions Reduction Performance under the EU ETS. Portugal has been one of the 
best preforming member states in the EU in CO₂ emissions reductions, ranking 7th best out of 27 
member states. Portugal also ranked 7
th
 in reducing their emissions relative to their ETS targets 
(see Figure 5.1). Portugal has also met its emissions targets every year from the beginning of the 
ETS through 2010, successfully reducing emissions each year (see Figure 8.1). In 2005 
Portugal’s verified emissions from ETS facilities totaled 36,425,933 tonnes of CO₂. In 2010 their 




Figure 8.1: EU ETS Emissions Reduction Performance in Portugal 
Portugal has also been successful at reducing its total amount of GHG emissions, not just 
those produced at ETS facilities (see Figure 8.2). In 2005 Portugal produced 85,984 thousand 
tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. By 2009 the amount of GHGs produced in the country fell to 74,583 
thousand tonnes.  
 






























































Portugal has also succeeded in reducing its total amount of CO₂ relative to the total 
population, from 6.4 tonnes of CO₂ per person in 2005 to 5.3 in 2009. This has been a steady, 
annual decrease each year in that time period. Portugal has substantially been out-preforming the 
average for the EU 27 on this measure. In 2005 the EU average was 8.6 and in 2009 it was 7.5. 
 
Figure 8.3: CO₂ Per Capita in Portugal and the EU 27, 2005-2009 
Overall, Portugal has been more successful than one might anticipate at reducing its 
emissions from EU ETS facilities and meeting its targets and reducing its overall emissions of 
GHGs given its traditional status as a policy laggard state. Portugal also has lower levels of CO₂ 
emissions per person than Denmark (a traditional leader state), Greece (another traditional 
laggard) and the EU 27 average. Portugal’s success may be mostly due to the relatively high 
amounts of renewable energy utilized in the country. Thirty-six percent of all electricity 
generated comes from renewable energy. If that same amount of electricity was generated by 
coal plants its emissions levels would be higher since carbon emissions from coal power plants 
are regulated under the ETS. If Portugal is able to replace its coal plants with electricity from 































CO₂ Emissions Per 
Person  Portugal 
CO₂ Emissions Per 
Person  EU 27 
90 
 
Chapter 9: Greece 
Introduction  
Greece is a unitary, centralized parliamentary democracy (Lijphart 1999). The president 
is the head of state and elected by the parliament and the prime minister is the head of 
government. The legislature, Vouli, is unicameral, has a total of 300 seats and is elected using 
proportional representation. Though Greece has a parliamentary system that uses proportional 
representation, it falls closer to majoritarian than consensus democracy due to its “impure” PR 
system (Lijphart 1999). Quality of life in Greece is relatively high but political corruption and 
financial instability have become increasingly problematic for this EU member state. Greece 
ranks 29
th
 on the Human Development Index, above Portugal, but below Sweden and Denmark, 
falling into the category of “very high human development”.
62
 GDP per capita was €20,400 in 
2010. Life expectancy is high at 78 for men and 83 for women, which is comparable to life 
expectancy in Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal. Adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are low at 
0.1% of the population, but obesity rates are among the highest in Europe, second only to the 
United Kingdom.  
Political corruption levels are very high in Greece, which received a 3.4 on the 
Corruption Perception Index
63
, and is one of the most corrupt in the EU. Bulgaria is the only 
member state with higher levels of corruption as measured by the CPI. All levels of education 
are tax-payer funded, and the first nine years are compulsory. The adult literacy rate is 97.5 
percent.
64
 Greece joined the European Union in 1981 and as a member of the European 
Monetary Union uses the Euro as its currency. In elections held in October of 2009 the 
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Panhellenic Socialist Movement captured 160 seats in the Vouli and formed a left leaning 
(left/right score 4.3) cabinet lead by George Papandreou.
65
 
Environmental institutions and past environmental record 
 Greece is considered a ‘laggard’ in environmental policy and prior to its entry into the 
EU did not have an environmental ministry. (Pridham et al. 1985; Anderson and Lieffrink 1997; 
Barnes and Barnes 1999). Just before its entry into the EU, Greece created the Ministry for 
Planning, Housing and the Environment on March 14, 1980, the first Greek ministry established 
to regulate the environment. Greece restructured its environmental ministry in 1985 combining it 
with the Ministry for Public Works to create the Ministry for the Environment, Spatial Planning 
and Public Works (Heinelt and Smith 2003). Though Greece created an environmental 
institution, that ministry did not have sole authority for making environmental policy, sharing 
that authority with other ministries (including the Ministry of Agriculture, Marine Commerce 
and others). This led to “the lack of effective coordination mechanisms, that has led some 
European analysts to characterize the Greek environmental ministry as a “weak” one (Getimis, 
Giannakourou, and Dimadma 2003, 153). In 2009 Greece again reorganized its environmental 
ministry, creating the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Change. Greece continues 




Greece has an average record of past compliance to existing EU environmental 
regulations and between 1995 and 2004 had 157 actions taken against it for infringement, the 7
th
 
highest in the EU 15 (Camyar 2007). In the October 2009 national parliamentary elections the 
Ecologist Greens, Oikologoi Prasinoi, received 2.5 percent of the vote share, but no seats. In 
                                                          
65
 See www.parlgov.org     
66
 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/17/44726277.pdf  
92 
 
elections to the European Parliament in June of the same year they were able to capture 3.5 
percent of the vote share and one of 22 seats.  
Among the current environmental problems Greece faces are water scarcity due to poor 
management and air pollution. Currently levels of nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides are some of 
the highest in all OECD countries
67
 and emissions of both continue to increase. Nitrogen oxides 
contribute to the formation of ground level ozone, an environmental health hazard.
68
 Optimal 
conditions for the formation for ground-level ozone tend to occur in warmer summer months, 
and if Greece experiences increasing temperatures that could create increased problems with 
ozone. Greece already has problems with high levels of ozone, and they could increase. Greece 
also has high levels of particulates in its air, which can also lead to environmental health 
problems. These problems have already been difficult to tackle in a country with weak 
environmental institutions and difficulties with enforcement and compliance. The current 
financial crisis in Greece has only lessened still further the capacity of the state to deal with 
them.
69
 Debt problems in Greece have grown so large that there have been serious questions 
about whether or not Greece will be able to stay in the Eurozone.  
Energy  
Current Energy Use. More than half of the electricity in Greece (55 percent) is 
generated from solid fuels like coal. The rest of electricity production is from petroleum (13 
percent), gases (18 percent) and renewables (13 percent). Greece produces less renewable energy 
per capita than Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal. Most of the renewable energy produced in 
Greece is from biomass and hydropower (887 thousand toe and 641 thousand toe in 2010, 
respectively). Geothermal energy, solar power, and wind are also sources of renewables utilized. 
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Greece is not a major oil producing state. Between 2005 and 2010, Greece produced and average 
of 6.308 thousand barrels of oil per day.
70
 
Potential for Renewable Energy. Wind energy potential is relatively low in Greece, and 
very similar to the potential in Portugal. Greece has an unrestricted technical potential for 
onshore wind energy of just over 500 TWh. Offshore potential is also just over 500 TWh (EEA 
2009a). Southern Europe in general is sunnier than northern Europe. Greece has good potential 
for the generation of solar energy;
71
 significantly higher than that in Denmark and Sweden, but 
not quite as high as Portugal. 
Vulnerability to Climate Change 
 Greece has a temperate climate characterized by hot dry summers and mild rainy 
winters.
72
 Greece already experiences annual inland and coastal flooding. Without taking any 
adaptive measures to reduce the risk of flooding, it is expected to increase drastically in Greece, 
particularly in the southern portions of the country. Coastal and inland flooding projections for 
Greece in 2080 are among the most severe in Europe.
73
 According to the European Environment 
Agency, Greece has already experienced changes in annual temperatures due to anthropogenic 
climate chance, with all regions experiencing some warming on average across all regions 
(between 0.2 – 0.6 °C per decade between 1976-2006), with the southwest experiencing 
pronounced warming in the summer, and some northern areas near Macedonia experiencing 
cooling in the winter. Greece also experienced changes in average precipitation, seeing decreases 
of up to 120 millimeters per decade between 1961 and 2006. These trends of increased warming 
and decreased precipitation are expected to continue into the future. Annual temperatures are 
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projected to be 3-4 °C higher and precipitation is expected to be 15 percent – 30 percent lower 
between 2080-2099 than in1980-1999.  
Current Climate Change Policy 
In 1999 Greece adopted a National Climate Change Program. A second was adopted in 
2002 and revised in 2007. The current program includes plans to reduce GHG emissions by 
reducing dependence on fossil fuels, increasing the use of renewable energy, and improving 
energy efficiency.
74
 Greece has not yet adopted a National Adaptation Plan
75
 to develop 
strategies and tools to minimize the potential negative effects of climate change.  
Public Opinion on Climate Change. In a 2009 Special Eurobarometer on European’s 
attitudes toward climate change 71 percent of Greek respondents felt that climate change is one 
of the “most serious problems facing the world” today. After Swedes, Greeks were the second 
most likely to respond with that answer. The average percentage of respondents across the whole 
EU was 47 percent answering that climate change was one of the “most serious problems facing 
the world”. Greeks were more likely than any other citizens in the EU to respond that climate 
change is a “very serious issue” (84 percent). Sixty-seven percent think that the EU is “not doing 
enough” to combat climate change while 29 percent think that the EU is “doing the right 
amount”. Greeks were the most likely to think that their government is “not doing enough” to 
combat climate change while only 13 percent of respondents felt the government was “doing the 
right amount”. Greeks also overwhelmingly responded that they felt that corporations and 
industry are “not doing enough” to combat climate change (94 percent) while only 4 percent felt 
they were doing enough. Greeks were more likely than any other citizens in Europe to respond 
this way. 
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While most Greek respondents were pessimistic about the amount being done about 
climate change and feel that it is a very serious problem, they are the most optimistic in Europe 
that it is not an unstoppable process. Only 18 percent of Greeks agreed that “climate change is an 
unstoppable process, we cannot do anything about it,” while 81 percent disagreed, thinking that 
climate change can be slowed or prevented. They also think that money spent on fighting climate 
chance is well spent and that spending could even have a positive effect on the European 
economy. Seventy-three percent of respondents agreed that fighting climate change can have a 
positive impact on the economy. Eighty percent of respondents even felt that it could boost 
growth which significant during the current economic downturn the country is currently in and 
the types of austerity measures other governments have been taking. 
Emissions Reduction Performance under the EU ETS. Greece has been one of the 
worst performing member states in the EU under the ETS (see Figure 5.1). They rank 23
rd
 out of 
27 in total verified per capita CO₂ (only Cyprus, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia had 
higher per captia emissions between 2005 and 2010). Greece also ranks 22
nd
 out of 27 in how 
well they met their emissions reduction targets. Greece failed to meet its ETS targets 2005, 2007, 
2008 and 2009, but did meet their emissions targets in 2006 and 2010. Overall, however, the 
trend has been a downward one. In 2005 Greece emitted 71,267,752 tonnes of CO₂ from ETS 
facilities and by 2010 it was emitting 59,939,996 tonnes of CO₂ (see Figure 9.1). 
Though Greece has had a poor record in reducing their ETS emissions, they have been 
successful in reducing their total GHG emissions between 2005 and 2009. In 2005 they produced 
134,356 thousand tonnes of CO₂ equivalent and in 2009 they produced 122,543 thousand tonnes 





Figure 9.1: EU ETS Emissions Reductions Performance in Greece 
 
Figure 9.2: Total GHG Emissions in Greece, 2005-2009 
Greece has also had some success reducing the amount of carbon dioxide it is emitting per 
person, but it is still significantly higher than the EU average. In 2005 Greece produced 10.2 
tonnes of CO₂ per person and in 2009 it produced 9.3 tonnes per person. The average amount 
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Chapter 10: Discussion and Conclusions 
Statistical Model Results  
The statistical models presented in chapter 4 yielded the following results: In the first 
model examining verified CO₂ emissions per capita (see Table 4.2), Corruption, Renewable 
Energy, Cabinet Ideology, Length of Membership, GDP, Post-Communist, and Length* 
Corruption all have statistically significant effects. The effect of Corruption is opposite of the 
direction predicted, with higher levels of corruption correlating to lower levels of verified 
emissions. Renewable Energy is also significant, and as domestic production of renewable 
energy increases, emissions decrease. Cabinet Ideology is significant, and as government 
ideology moves to the right, emissions increase. Length of Membership was also significant, 
indicating that the longer a country was a member of the EU, the higher their verified emissions. 
Higher GDPs were associated with higher verified emissions, and post-communist countries 
were more likely to reduce their verified emissions. 
 In Model 2 (see Table 4.3), Past Infringement, Corruption, Renewable Energy, Oil 
Production, Length of Membership, and Length*Corruption all have statistically significant 
effects. Higher rates of past infringement are associated with lower levels of verified emissions. 
Renewable Energy, consistent with effects seen in Model 1, is significant. Increasing the amount 
of electricity generated from renewable energy is associated with lowering verified emissions. 
Oil production had surprising significant effects, opposite of the hypothesized direction, with 
increasing production associated with reduction of emissions. Corruption, Length of Membership 
and Length*Corruption again were all significant. The independent effect of corruption indicates 
that countries that are more corrupt are better at reducing emissions, and the independent effect 
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of Length of Membership suggests that countries that have been in the EU longer tend to have 
higher emissions. 
In Model 3 (See Table 4.4), Corruption, Renewable Energy, Oil Production, Length of 
Membership, and Length*Corruption all have statistically significant effects. It is important and 
interesting to note that Corruption, Renewable Energy, Length of Membership, and 
Length*Corruption all have significant effects that are in the opposite direction as their effects on 
verified emissions in Model 1 and Model 2. Higher levels of oil production are surprisingly 
associated with increased likelihood of meeting emissions targets. 
In Model 4 (see Table 4.5), only Renewable Energy and Green in EP had significant 
effects. Higher levels of renewable energy production are surprisingly associated with a 
decreased likelihood of meeting targets. The effect of Green in EP was as predicted, and as the 
number of green party representatives in the European Parliament increases, so does the 
likelihood of meeting emissions targets.  
Case Study Results and Comparisons 
 The case study analyses further examined the performance of Sweden, Denmark, 
Portugal and Greece in reducing their CO₂ emissions from facilities included in the EU ETS. 
Table 10.1 compares the cases against each other across the statistically significant variables 
from the OLS and Logit models in chapter 4.  
Corruption and Length of Membership. Given that Sweden and Denmark are both low 
in governmental corruption, and Portugal and Greece have relatively high levels of corruption, 
but they do not group similarly in regard to emissions reduction performance, the effect of 
corruption is unlikely to be as simple as more corruption leading to better emissions related 
performance. In fact, some newer member states may have incentive to perform better on their 
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emissions targets, and may also be given targets that are easier to meet, or are more lenient in the 
first place. In the case of Greece, it seems that the combination of weak environmental 
institutions combined with high levels of corruption and current economic troubles are 
contributing strongly to their record of poor performance under the ETS.  
Table 10.1: Case Comparison across Statistically Significant Variables* 
 Sweden Denmark Portugal  Greece 
Past 
Infringement 
55 47 185 157 
Corruption 9.2 
 
9.4 6.2 4.2 
Renewable 
Energy 
76.745 10.144 14.491 6.165 






7.22 4.14 5.99 
Year of EU 
Membership 
1995 1973 1986 1981 
GDP €34,883 €40,867 €15,667 €19,850 
 
*Corruption is the average Corruption Perception Index value from 2005-2010; Renewable 
Energy is the average amount of renewable energy produced per capita between 2005 and 2010 
in tonnes of CO₂; Cabinet Ideology is an aggregate score of all governments in a ruling coalition 
between 2005-2010. If multiple governments were in power during that time period, it is an 
average of those scores once multiplied by the number of years in power. Oil production is an 
average value of production between 2005-2010 in thousands of barrels per day, per capita. GDP 
is a per-capita value.  
In the statistical models, Length of Membership, Corruption, and Length*Corruption all 
reach statistical significance, and the direction of their effects is opposite for verified emissions 
and meeting targets. Clearly, the combined effect of corruption and length of membership is 
important, but so are the independent effects of these variables. However, the mechanisms why 
still seem unclear. Newer member states are also much more likely to be corrupt, and are more 
likely to be post-communist. Newer member states also tend to have much lower per-capita 
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GDPs. These factors are controlled for in the models, so it seems likely that there may be some 
other variables influencing this relationship that are not well captured by the models.  
Table 10.2 compares all 27 member states against the year they joined the EU, their 
levels of corruption and their rank relative to other member states in their levels of verified 
emissions per person of CO₂ from ETS facilities, and how well they are meeting their emissions 
targets. A higher ranking on verified emissions represents the lowest per person emissions, and 
therefore better performance. A higher ranking on targets represents better performance in 
meeting ETS emissions targets. A large disparity between the two, when performance on 
meeting targets is high, but the ranking on verified emissions is low, may indicate that a state has 
lenient targets. By examining the difference between verified emissions and targets, I found that 
most of the member states with the largest disparities between these two different indicators of 
performance in emissions reduction had entered the EU relatively recently, in 2004. From the 
table, another somewhat rough pattern emerges in that the newest member states, those who 
entered in 2007 and 2004, are more likely to have higher levels of corruption than states entering 
the EU in 1995 or earlier. More research is needed to understand the relationship between 
corruption and length of membership as it affects both verified emissions reductions and meeting 
emissions targets. 
Cabinet Ideology. Cabinet ideology may have some effect in the cases, but has mixed 
effects in the statistical models. Only in Model 1, which includes the EU 27, does Cabinet 
Ideology have a statistically significant effect indicating that left-leaning governments are 
associated with reducing emissions. In terms of meeting targets, the statistical models do not 
suggest that cabinet ideology plays a role. The cases indicate that those countries that are both 
reducing emissions and are meeting their targets are the ones with the most left-leaning 
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Table 10.2: Corruption and Emissions Performance in the EU 27 
 
Year of Membership  Corruption   Verified Emissions            Targets  
 
2007 Enlargement countries 
 Bulgaria  3.8   15   14 
 Romania   3.7     6                3 
 
2004 Enlargement countries  
 Cyprus   5.9   24   19 
 Czech Republic*  4.8   26     4 
 Estonia  6.6   27   13 
 Hungary  5.1     5   11 
 Latvia   4.6     1   15 
 Lithuania  4.8     2     8 
 Malta   5.9    16   18 
 Poland   4.4    21     2  
 Slovakia  4.6    13     5 
 Slovenia   6.5    12   20 
 
1995 Enlargement  
 Austria  8.2    10   16 
 Finland   9.3    25   12 
 Sweden   9.2      4   10 
 
1986 Enlargement 
 Portugal  6.2      7     7 
Spain   6.5      9   24 
 
1981 Enlargement  
 Greece   4.2     23   22 
 
1973 Enlargement  
Denmark  9.4     20   23 
Ireland   7.7     14   21 
United Kingdom 8.1     11   27 
 
1952 Founding Members, European Coal and Steal Community 
 Belgium   7.2     18    6 
 France   7.1       3     1 
 Germany  8.0     22             26 
 Italy   4.7       8             25 
 Luxembourg   8.4     19             17 
 Netherlands   8.8     17    9 
*Countries in italics rank at least ten places lower on levels of verified emissions than they do on 
meeting their EU ETS targets.  
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governments, Portugal and Sweden. However, Greece is not meeting targets and has only a 
slightly less leaning cabinet than Sweden. Greece has a cabinet ideology score of 5.99 while 
Sweden’s is a 5.71. 
Past Environmental Records. There has been a distinction made between leaders and 
laggards in environmental policy and protection in European countries. In particular, Denmark, 
Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands all have records as leaders in 
environmental policy while Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Belgium all have 
reputations as environmental laggards (Anderson and Liefferink 1998; Barnes and Barnes 1999). 
The case studies specifically examine two traditional leader states, Sweden and Denmark, and 
two traditional laggard states, Portugal and Greece. As Table 5.1 indicates, the traditional 
reputations for being an environmental leader or laggard do not seem to correspond to being a 
leader or laggard state in regard to emissions reductions. Based on their previous reputations, one 
might assume that Sweden and Denmark would be more effective at reducing their emissions 
than Portugal and Greece. However, the performance of these countries in regard to emissions 
reduction is not so simple. Sweden is doing well in reducing its overall emissions from EU ETS 
facilities, ranking third out of all EU member states and meeting its targets, while Denmark has 
been struggling to reduce its CO₂ emissions. When examining emissions reduction performance 
of the traditional laggards, Portugal has been successful in reducing their overall verified 
emissions from EU ETS facilities, while Greece has had little success, frequently missing its 
targets and has the 23
rd
 worst record in overall verified emissions rates.  
The reputations of environmental leaders and laggards may be changing as the types of 
environmental issues that countries are facing change. State capacity and effectiveness of 
environmental institutions are directly related to a state’s ability to enforce environmental law. 
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“Greece, Spain and Portugal have often lacked the capacity (resources) rather than the 
willingness to effectively implement EU policies” (Koutalakis and Font 2006, 6). Differences in 
the severity and type of other environmental problems in a country besides climate change may 
have shaped the countries’ institutions, leaving some states better or worse equipped to deal with 
a transboundary problem like climate change. Some countries, like Portugal and Greece, did not 
have institutional experience with environmental protection until they joined the EU and were 
able to create institutions when they were aware of the types of environmental law they would be 
expected to enforce as member states. Table 10.3 compares the cases across several variables, 
including dates when environmental ministries were first introduced and/or restructured, as well 
as across several factors relating to their performance in reducing carbon emissions. 
Table 10.3: Environmental Institutions and Emissions Performance across Cases 
 Sweden Denmark Portugal Greece 
Leader/Laggard Leader Leader Laggard Laggard 






























Past Infringement 55 47 185 157 
Emissions per 
capita 
2.16 5.10 2.88 6.07 
Adaptation Plan Yes Yes Yes No 
Allocation Plan 
Accepted 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Meeting targets Yes No Yes No 
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Greece has several contextual factors that all tie in to its poor performance in reducing 
emissions. It has not been meeting its EU ETS targets in most years; it has not yet adopted an 
adaptation plan, it has the highest per-capita CO₂ emissions (in tonnes) of any other case 
examined, and it had a relatively late establishment of an environmental ministry, which also had 
a reputation for being weak and lacking capacity (Getimis, Giannakourou, and Dimadma 2003). 
Denmark also has high rates of per-capita CO₂ emissions relative to the two leaders, Sweden and 
Portugal. A record of past infringement does seem to follow the patterns of traditional leaders 
and laggards, with Denmark and Sweden out-performing Portugal and Greece in terms of the 
number of formal infringement actions taken against them.  
Energy. The amount of renewable energy being produced in the country is both 
significant for reducing verified emissions in the statistical models and appears to be significant 
in the cases, with Sweden and Portugal producing more per person than Denmark and Greece. 
However, in terms of meeting EU emissions targets, the statistical models suggest that countries 
producing more renewable energy would be less likely to meet emissions targets, and the cases 
reflect the opposite, with Denmark and Greece producing the least renewable energy and missing 
their targets, while Sweden and Portugal produce the most energy from renewables and meet 
their targets. Given this, it is also important to note that all of the countries produce some 
renewable energy from multiple sources (see Table 10.4). In addition, all countries have potential 
for expanded production across multiple sources of renewable energy. 
Oil Production does not seem to play a major role in the cases, though Denmark and 
Greece are the two largest producers of oil, and are the two states failing to meet their targets and 
effectively reduce their emissions. However, Denmark is a clear outlier as one of the largest 
producers of oil per capita in all of Europe. By comparison, oil production in the other cases  
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Table 10.4: Renewable Energy Production by Source, 2010 
 Sweden Denmark Portugal Greece EU 27 
 
Renewables Per Capita  76.745 10.144 14.491 6.165 19.13 
Biomass 
Thousand toe 
11387 2424 2994 887 112725 
Geothermal 
Thousand toe 
0 10 190 27 5881 
Hydro power 
Thousand toe 
5709 2 1388 641 31492 
Solar 
Thousand toe 
11 16 76 197 3686 
Wind 
Thousand toe 
301 671 790 233 12817 
Energy Intensity 
Kg of oil equivalent per 1,000 EUR of GDP 
156.67 104.05 179.66 165.47 167.99 
Electricity Generated from Renewables 
% of gross electricity consumption 
56.37 27.39 33.27 12.27 18.21 
Environmental Expenditure – Public Sector  
% of GDP 
.35 .66 .67 .76 .69 
Environmental Expenditure – Industry 
% of GDP 
.32 .43 .27 .36 .43 
Source: Eurostat.  Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/guip/mapAction.do?indicator=ten00082_2&mapMode=dynamic
&mapTab=1 
seems incredibly negligible (see Table 10.1). Even so, Denmark is moving towards a goal of all 
domestic energy production coming from renewable sources by 2050
76
. Future research will 
allow examination of how planned policy shifts like these affect countries’ energy portfolios, and 
if they result in desired emissions reductions.  
 Public Opinion on Climate Change. The impact of national public opinion on climate 
change does not seem to have clear effects. See Table 10.5 for a comparison of responses to 
questions in Special Eurobarometer 322 on climate change.  In Sweden, the level of concern 
about climate change is high, and Swedes think the issue is very serious, but so do Greeks and 
they have opposite records of emissions performance. 






Table 10.5: Public Opinion on Climate Change 
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Portuguese are the least likely citizens in any of the cases examined to think that climate change 
is one of the most serious issues facing the world, but their emissions reduction record has been 
very good. In addition, Public Opinion did not yield a clear or significant effect in any of the 
statistical models.  This lack of effect is possibly due to the relatively high levels of concern 
about climate change across Europe. Concern about climate change is already widespread 
enough in the EU that its influence was seen in the existence of enough political will to establish 
the EU ETS in the first place. The actual results of the policy in terms of reduction state by state 
seem to be driven more by factors other than the concerns of the public. 
 Emissions Performance. Sweden and Portugal have the best records out of the cases in 
meeting their ETS targets, meeting their targets every year between 2005 and 2010, and having 
the lowest levels of per-capita emissions from ETS facilities (see Figure 10.1). 
 
Figure 10.1: Emissions Performance of Case Study Member States: Verified Emissions Per 
Capita from ETS Facilities 
Sweden and Portugal also outperform Denmark and Greece in total emissions of CO₂ 
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are also doing well when compared to the average for all member states, while Denmark and 
Greece are doing poorly (see Figure 10.2). 
 
Figure 10.2: Total CO₂ Emission Per Capita across Cases and the EU 27 
Conclusions and Future Research   
A country’s efficacy at reducing their emissions seems to be driven by factors that are 
different from what seems to predict their ability to meet emissions targets. Being highly corrupt, 
producing more renewable energy, and having been in the EU longer, seems to indicate success 
in reducing emissions, according to the models in Chapter 4. However, low levels of corruption, 
producing less renewable energy, and having been in the EU less time, seems to indicate an 
increased likelihood of meeting emissions targets. In terms of actual, substantive outcomes, it 



























Total CO₂ Per Person 
Sweden 
Total CO₂ Per Person 
Portugal 
Total CO₂ Per Person EU 
27 
Total CO₂ Per Person 
Denmark 
Figure 10.2: Total CO₂ Emission Per Capita across Cases and the EU 27 




potentially more important for providing lessons that can enhance future policy. The desired goal 
is to reduce emissions, and ideally, reduce emissions in all countries. However, the setting of 
emissions targets is clearly influenced by domestic and EU level politics, and this context is 
important. Desires for fairness and burden-sharing across the EU member states in meeting 
Kyoto targets is part of a political reality that is unlikely to go away anytime soon. There are 
large discrepancies in terms of institutional capacity, wealth, and other resources that would 
make it seemingly too difficult to push a single common standard to be applied in each member 
state. Additionally, by setting targets, the EU may be more effectively maximizing emissions 
reduction by putting more pressure on states with better capacity to reduce their own emissions. 
Future research is needed to better disentangle the different influences that improve emissions 
reduction, versus the factors that improve the ability to meet targets. 
Overall, energy policy does have direct implications for total emissions in a country and 
therefore energy policy and climate policy are two arenas that continue to be closely tied to each 
other.  Having a commitment to producing renewable energy does seem to be connected to better 
performance in lowering emissions. There is evidence indicative of this relationship in both the 
quantitative analysis and the qualitative case studies. Since the time period examined in this 
study includes the trial phase and the first phase of compliance, patterns of influencing variables 
may change the longer the EU ETS remains in place. States that have trouble meeting their 
targets for the first compliance phase of Kyoto (which also overlaps with the second phase of the 
ETS) may be under more pressure than other states to start meeting their targets. Future research 
is needed to examine the performance of EU member states in reducing their ETS facility 
emissions over a longer period of time, and eventually, evaluate if there were any major 
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differences between the initial trial phase, and the subsequent phases where Kyoto compliance 
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